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The central issue throughout the history of the struggle for the
freedom of the press has been the appropriate accommodation of gov-
ernment authority with press rights.' The struggle has produced no
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1. See F. SIBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PREss iN ENoLAND, 1476-1776 (1952):
One basic assumption appears to be common to all theories of liberty of the press
.... This assumption is that freedom of the press is not and never can be absolute. All
agree that some forms of restraint are necessary and that the government has a legitimate
function to define the limitations. They differ only as to the nature and number of these
limitations.
Id 9. As Professor John Hallowell noted with regard to liberalist theory, the "central problem
... is the relation between the individual and authority." . HALLOWELL, MAIN CURRENTS IN
MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 89 (1950). But f L. TRI E, AMERICAN CONSIlUIONAL LAW at
v (1978) ("conventional ways even of stating the choices between greater freedom or equality, on
the one hand, and greater governmental power, on the other hand ... are remarkably unil-
luminating as well as misleadingly ahistorical") (emphasis in original).
The question whether freedom of the press differs from freedom of speech under the first
amendment to the United States Constitution has been debated intensely in recent years. See
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 797-802 (1978) (Burger, CJ., concurring); Herbert v.
Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 986-91 (2d Cir. 1977) (Oakes, ., concurring), rev'd, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); 568
F.2d at 997 (Meskill, J., dissenting); Abrams, The Press Is Dji4erent. Jefiections on Justice Stewart
and the Autonomous Press, 7 HoFsTRA L. REV. 563 (1979); Baker, Press Rights and Government
Power to Structure the Press, 34 U. MIAMI L. REv. 819, 828-36 (1980); Bezanson, The New Free
Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REv. 731, 731-32 (1977); Blanchard, 7he InstitutionalPress andIts First
Amendment Pivileges, 1978 Sup. Cr. RaV. 225, 227; Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 77, 118-19 (1975); Lewis, A Preferred Positionfor Journalism?, 7 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 595 (1979); Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom ofthePress a Redundancy: Wh'at Does ItAdd
to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HAsTINGS L.. 639, 650, 658 (1975); Oakes, Proof of Actual Malice in
.Defamation Actions: An UnsolvedDilemma, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 655, 674-78 (1979); Sack, Reflec-
tions on the Wrong Questiorn Special Constitutional P'vilegefor the Institutional Press, 7 HoFSTRA
L. REV 629 (1979); Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L. 631, 633-34 (1975); Van Alstyne,
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clear winner. Equipoise between press and government has been sug-
gested as the ideal implicit in our constitutional scheme. 2 But the more
popular view may be that "[t]he Constitution. . . establishes the con-
test, not its resolution."'3
Searching the Constitution for guidance, various players have ex-
trapolated sets of principles that favor one side or the other. The his-
toric libertarian theory and the relatively recent social-responsibility
theory encompass these competing principles. Depending on whether
the courts have found a libertarian or a social-responsibility theory of
press freedom apposite, the victory has gone either to the press or to the
government.4 The choice of controlling theory is therefore of utmost
importance in the developing field of news-gathering law. For when
access is sought to premises or records under government control, the
theory selected is crucial in determining whether press or government
will benefit from a presumption of right.
Today the presumption appears to favor government discretion in
deciding to close its doors to conceal its records.5 When asserting a
news-gathering right, press and public inevitably assume the posture of
Comment-The Hazards to the Press of Claiming a "Preferred Position," 28 HASTINGS L.J. 761,
768-70 (1977); Note, Examining the Institutional Interpretation of the Press Clause, 58 TEx. L. REV.
171 (1979); Comment, Problems in Defining the Institutional Status of the Press, 11 U. RICH. L.
REv. 177, 205-07 (1976).
For other commentary that has touched on this issue, see sources cited in Lange, supra, at
77 n.4; Sack, supra, at 633 n.27. The first salvo in this debate may have been fired many years ago,
however, when President Franklin Roosevelt termed the press clause of the first amendment "pure
surplusage." See M. BLANCHARD, THE HUTCHINS COMMISSION, THE PRESS AND THE RESPONSI-
BILITY CONCEPT 6 (Association for Education in Journalism Monograph No. 49, 1977). See also
id 252-80 (survey of early cases dealing with asserted institutional status or privilege for press).
It is assumed in this article that the media-whose business it is to compile and disseminate
information-is most likely to avail itself of access to government information. Much of the anal-
ysis, however, applies equally to the public. Indeed, the "press privilege" debate may divert atten-
tion from the more basic issues addressed herein.
Bezanson's focus on independence from government and his analysis of private rather than
public interest is largely consistent with the propositions advanced here, except that he interprets
those principles only in relation to the press clause of the first amendment. See Bezanson, supra,
at 732, 748-49, 751. It is not important for present purposes whether the courts ultimately embrace
Bezanson's interpretation or that of other commentators regarding the suggested dichotomy be-
tween the speech and press clauses, as long as the courts maintain traditional first amendment
emphasis on the above principles in this type of case.
2. See A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 86-88 (1975). See also F. WATKINS, THE
POLITICAL TRADITION OF THE WEsT-A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN LIBERALISM
267-68 (1948).
3. Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975).
4. Compare notes 21-52, 76-98 infra and accompanying text with notes 123-54, 177-210 infra
and accompanying text.
5. See notes 223-300 infra and accompanying text.
Vol. 1982:1] NEWS-GA THERING/PUBLIC1ATION
disapproving of the government's choice to cloak itself from scrutiny.6
Thus, it seems incumbent on press and public not only to object,7 but
also to bear the burden of demonstrating the desirability of access or
the unconstitutionality of the status quo.8 The establishment of the
contours of a news-gathering right one step at a time has reinforced the
legitimacy of government secrecy at every step.9 The proposition that
government in a given case should open its doors rejects the presump-
tion that government should not have closed its doors in the first place.
The Supreme Court has bifurcated the press's function into gath-
ering and publication, giving greater protection-under prior-restraint
analysis-to publication.10 By according news-gathering less protec-
tion the Court has given implicit sanction to the presumption that it is
the right of the government to deny information to its citizens. As it
has emerged, this presumption has become almost irrebuttable. If the
Court's distinction between gathering and publication is correct, the
former may be of greater practical significance and broader constitu-
tional import than the latter. If the dichotomy is specious, as this arti-
cle contends, then one's choice of theory to define the duties of
government and press generally decides the contest.
The first step is to define the choices; therefore, this article initially
analyzes the disparate rights and duties of the press under the liberta-
rian and social-responsibility theories. Next, the birth and potential
growth of the news-gathering right are examined. Finally, a resolution
of the contest is proposed in which the focus shifts from a news-gather-
ing right by the press on behalf of the public to a general obligation of
government to provide unrestricted access to information. This change
in analytic orientation eschews a surrogate function for the press on
behalf of the "public's right to know."" This special status of the press
6. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Houchins v. KQED,
Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817 (1974).
7. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 375-76, 392 (1979); id at 400-01 (Powell,
J., concurring).
8. See id at 400-01 (Powell, J., concurring). Enactment of open-meetings laws, for example,
arguably establishes instances in which the public need not shoulder this burden. See WSDR,
Inc. v. Ogle County, No. 80-MR-27, slip. op. at 1 (15th Judicial Cir. Ct., Ogle County, II. March
17, 1981), aft'd, 100 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 427 N.E.2d 603 (1981).
9. To paraphrase Professor Bickel, to take the negative is to render the debate legitimate by
engaging in it. See A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 73 (1975). See also Pember, The
Burgeoning Scope of "Access Privacy" and the Portentfor a Free Press, 64 IOWA L. REv. 1155,
1189 (1979): "The mere existence of [freedom of information] laws seemingly concedes govern-
mental power to regulate press access .... Additionally, if Congress has the power to grant
access, it has the power to revoke such a grant."
10. See notes 224-26, 261-67, 292 infra and text accompanying notes 224-26, 261-67 infra.
11. See note 160 infra and accompanying text.
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should not determine the government's duty to disclose; 12 rather the
affirmative responsibility of the government to keep its operations open
to inspection or to justify its secrecy should be the sole determinant. 13
It is suggested that the Supreme Court's analysis of a news-gathering
right is a departure from traditional first amendment doctrine 14 and
should be abandoned in favor of a presumption that the government
has no right not to speak; government should be presumed to have a
duty to communicate information within its possession. Under this
analysis, the private interests of the press are maintained in accordance
with libertarian theory, and the government assumes the duty of acting
in the public interest in accordance with social-responsibility theory.
I. LIBERTARIAN AND SocIAL-REsPoNsIBILiTY THEORIES
Two theories have laid claim to constitutional justification under
the first amendment. One's choice between them dictates the role of
the press and agreement or disagreement with the Supreme Court's
news-gathering analysis. Confidence in government's proficiency and
self-discipline, and the role of the press vis-A-vis the public distinguish
the two theories.
A. Libertarian Theory of the Press.
The writings of John Milton'5 and John Locke16 generally are
credited with containing the roots of the libertarian theory,17 although
Greco-Roman and early Christian thinkers contributed to libertarian
12. For a more thorough explanation of the potential for governmental imposition of affirm-
ative obligations when the press acts on behalf of the public's right to know, see notes 155-76, 284-
89 infra and accompanying text.
13. At the very least, concern with issues such as whether the press's news-gathering right is
greater than that of the public, see note 1 supra, and notes 234-44 infra and accompanying text,
has obscured the issue of the extent to which government should be accountable. See Houchins v.
KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 25-38 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
14. See notes 245-55 infra and accompanying text..
15. See J. MILTON, AREoPAGITICA (Eng. Rep. 1972) (lst ed. n.p. 1644).
16. See J. Locan, A Letter Concerning Toleration, reprintedin 6 THE WORiKs OF JOHN LOciE
I (London 1823) (Ist ed. n.p. 1689); J. LocKE, OF HuMAN UNDERSTANDING, reprintedin 1-3 THE
WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE (London 1823) (1st ed. n.p. 1689); J. LocKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL
GoVERNMENT, re.printedn 5 THE WORKS OF JOHN LocKE 338 (London 1823) (1st ed. n.p. 1689).
17. See M. FRANKLIN, THE FIRsT A ENDMENT AND THE FouRTH ESTATE 10-12 (1977); W.
RIVns, W. ScHRAMM & C. CHRISTIANS, REsPONSIBILTY IN MASS COMMUNICATION 40 (3d ed.
1980).
Professor Jay Jensen has identified numerous variations of "liberalism." J. JENSEN, LIBER-
ALISM, DEMOCRACY AND THE MAss MEDIA 15-16 & n.16, 28 (Institute of Communications Re-
search, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Monograph 1959). For example, classical
liberalism-the body of thought traditionally associated with seventeenth and eighteenth century
thinkers-has been viewed as a socio-economic, religious, and politico-legalistic movement. See
lid 17-26; J. HALLOWELL, su.pra note 1, at 89-92, 115-17, 119-24, 129-30, 135-40.
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fumdamentals.' 8 Libertarians espouse diversity of expression through a
free and open exchange of ideas as the best means of achieving truth.19
In addition to promoting the discovery of truth, uninhibited expression
fosters attainment of self-fulfillment and control of governmental
abuse.20 Realization of these values depends on adherence to the fol-
lowing operative principles: independence from government and em-
phasis on the right of the individual--the speaker-as opposed to the
right of the public.
1. Independence from government. The "self-righting process"
envisioned by John Milton illustrates the libertarians' belief in natural
forces that skew if government violates the principle of individual inde-
pendence. In his 1644 treatise on intellectual freedom, Areopagitica,
Milton advocates the derivation of truth from the free expression of all
opinions, unrestrained by government endorsement or suppression of
any position.2' John Stuart Mill elaborates on this theme and criticizes
18. J. JENSEN, supra note 17, at 31-43:
Among the fundamental Liberal ideas inherited from the Greeks was the notion of
rational, moral men living in a universe ruled by transcendental rational and moral
law ....
... And Stoic humanitarianism and the Christian theory of the person, softening
the harsh materialism of the Greek atomists, carried into the main stream of Liberal
thought an egalitarianism which not only indelibly marked the character of Classical
Liberalism, but was crucial also to the development of Modem Democracy.
Id 31; see J. HALLOWELL, sufpra note 1, at 111; F. WATINS, sufpra note 2, at x-xi, 3-61.
19. See J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 21, 55-56 (C.V. Shields ed. 1956 (1st ed. np. 1859); J.
MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 74-76 (Eng. Rep. 1972) (1st ed. n.p. 1644). Free and open expression also
facilitates decisionmaking and provides a means by which conflicts can be resolved without resort
to physical force. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREssION 7 (1970). The concept
of free, uninhibited expression was later popularized through the metaphor of the "marketplace of
ideas." See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, I., joined by Brandeis, 3.,
dissenting). See also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 584 (1951) (Douglas, 3., dissenting)
(falsehood is exposed when ideas compete in the market); United States v. Associated Press, 52 F.
Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aftd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (first amendment presupposes 'multitude
of tongues").
Diversity of expression is not unique to libertarian theory. Social responsibility theorists also
endorse the value of such diversity, but they contend that libertarian principles in fact have not
yielded diversity. See 3. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? 82-83 (1973); Barron,
Access to fAe Press-4 New irst Amendment Pdght, 80 HAv. L. REv. 1641, 1643-47 (1967). But
.ee Bezanson, Herbert v. Lando, Editorial Judgment, and Freedom of the Press: An Essay, 1978 U.
Ia. L. F. 605, 611-22 (marketplace does operate in mass-media setting, albeit roughly, but in any
event its operation is not the sole justification for freedom of the press).
20. See generally T. EMERSON, supra note 19, at 6-7; Blasi, The Checking Value in First
Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 521, 529-54; Cass, FirstAmendmentAccess
to Government Facilities, 65 VA. L. REv. 1287, 1310-12 (1979); Karst, Equality as a Central Princi-
ple in the First Amendment, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 20, 23-26 (1975).
21. See J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (Eng. Rep. 1972) (1st ed. n.p. 1644):
And though all the windes of doctrin were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth
be in the field, we do injuriously by licencing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength.
Let her and Falshood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the wors, in a free and open
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those who would attempt to cull the falsehoods from this exchange.
Not only does Mill agree with Milton that government is unable to
ascertain "truth,"22 but he identifies the value to mankind of even the
expression of definitive falsehood: "If the opinion is right, [mankind is]
deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong,
they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and
livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error. '23
Thus, government intervention in the process of free expression "rob[s]
the human race." 24
Although not specifically writing about liberalism, Professor Vin-
cent Blasi's characterization of public officials as a citizen's potential
oppressors rather than his agents25 is consonant with liberalist philoso-
phy. Government is the "chief foe of liberty, 2 6 and any governmental
breach of neutrality toward expression is gravely suspect.2 7 American
colonists28 expressed great concern about the penchant of government
to pursue aggressive expansion of its authority.29 Alexander Hamilton
encounter? ... [I]t is not possible for man to sever the wheat from the tares, the good
fish from the other frie; that must be the Angels Ministery at the end of mortall things.
Yet if all cannot be of one mind, as who looks they should be? this doubtles is more
wholsome, more prudent, and more Christian: that many be tolerated rather than all
compell'd.
Id 74-76.
Jefferson's landslide re-election in 1804 proved to him the efficacy of the self-righting process.
See Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1805), reprinted in 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFER-
SON 381-82 (Definitive ed., A. Bergh ed. 1905).
22. J.S. MILL, supra note 19, at 21-22.
23. Id 21; see id 55-56, 64. See also W. HOCKING, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 95 (1947):
A socially authoritative control of the allowable contents of the public idea pool
might save the mind from confusion, but at the cost of also saving it from the arduous
effort to reach valid judgments; it would tend to deprive society of a citizenship prepared
to fend off illusions and shams through its experience of their nature.
For a persuasive and well-reasoned view that even repetition of others' falsehoods serves first
amendment values and should be protected, see Note, Protecting the Public Debate" A Proposed
Constitutional Privilege ofAccurate Republication, 58 TEx. L. REv. 623, 630-31 (1980).
24. J.S. MILL, supra note 19, at 21.
25. Blasi, supra note 20, at 564.
26. Peterson, The SocialResponsibility Theory of the Press, in F. SIEBERT, T. PETERSON & W.
SCHRAMM, FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS 76 (1956).
27. See Bezanson, supra note 1, at 734.
28. Professor Blasi "casts some doubt" on the arguments made by Dean Leonard Levy, see
L. LEvY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS: LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION IN EARLY AMERICAN HIS-
TORY 246-49 (1963), that a libertarian view of the first amendment did not prevail until after the
debate surrounding the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, Blasi, supra note 20, at 536 n.60. See also
Z. CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNIrED STATES 22 (1941). For an entertaining criticism of
those who attempt to divine the framers' intent, see Note, Good Intentions, New Inventions, and
Article V Constitutional Conventions, 58 Tnx. L. REv. 131 (1979).
29. See B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 56 (1967);
Bezanson, supra note 1, at 783; Lewis, Keynote Address: The Right to Scrutinize Government: To-
ward a First Amendment Theory ofAccountability, 34 U. MIAMI L. REv. 793, 805-06 (1980). See
generally J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOvERNMENT, supra note 16, at § 1, at 338;
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proposed that in a government of enumerated powers the absence of
specific authority to restrain expression suffices to preserve liberty of
the press.30 Thomas Jefferson thought that press independence re-
quires explicit protection; he wrote that "free presses" are a "fence
against wrong" and that the states "had . . . delineated . . . these
fences. . . m. . . declarations of rights and constitutions."' 3' Govern-
ment interference with speech is particularly alarming to a libertarian,
not only because it represents an incursion on individualism and a
skewing of the self-righting process, but also because such interference
undermines the ability of speakers to check governmental excess.3 2
This "checking value" of expression has even been posited as "the pri-
mary function of the press under the libertarian view."33
Professor Blasi suggests that free expression, as a force against
abuse of official power, was perhaps the foremost concern among the
drafters of the first amendment.3 4 In his excellent treatise on the check-
ing function, Blasi reasons that the abuse of official power, which is
likely to occur,35 is a more serious concern than the abuse of private
power.36 Blasi asserts the need for professional critics of government
who are able to reach mass audiences to effect opposition to a particu-
lar official or policy.37 Blasi postulates that this system presupposes
popular sovereignty, 38 perhaps the essential element of a liberalist phi-
§ 137, at 420-21; § 143, at 424; § 229, at 474. The drafters of the American Declaration of Indepen-
dence and the U.S. Constitution borrowed heavily from Locke. W. KENDALL, JOHN LOCKE AND
THE DOCTRINE OF MAJORITY RULE 58 (Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, Monograph No. 2,
1941).
30. THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton). Other Federalists had similar perspectives. See
E. HUDON, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN AMERICA 1-4 (1963).
31. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Noah Webster (Dec. 4, 1790), reprinted in FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON: EARLY AMERICAN LIBERTARIAN THEORIES 342 (L.
Levy ed. 1966); see 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 33-34 (Definitive ed. A. Bergh ed.
1907) (letter to Judge John Tyler of June 28, 1804) (freedom of the press as a "most effectual"
avenue to truth should not be manacled and will in turn place "manacles" on those who would
take advantage of governmental office).
32. "No government ought to be without censors; and where the press is free, no one ever
will." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to President George Washington (Sept. 9, 1792), reprinted in 8
THE WRITINGs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 406 (Definitive ed., A. Bergh ed. 1907).
33. Bezanson, supra note 1, at 735; see Siebert, The Libertarian Theory of the Press, in F.
SIEBERT, T. PETERSON & W. SCHRAMM, FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS 47, 51 (1956).
34. See Blasi, supra note 20, at 527-28, 533.
35. Id at 529 & n.24, 541. It certainly cannot be doubted that the public sector invariably
attempts to expand its influence over the private sector. See, e.g., Moynihan, State vs. Academe,
HARPER'S, Dec. 1980, at 31.
36. Blasi, supra note 20, at 538-39.
37. Id 541-42.
38. Id 542. "For if one does not approve a significant role for the ordinary citizen as the
ultimate judge of official conduct, there is little reason to place as much emphasis on mass com-
munication as does a proponent of the checking value." Id
Vol. 1982:1]
DUKE L4WJOURNAL [Vol. 1982:1
losophy. This concept contemplates that the government is a mere
trustee of the authority ultimately vested in the electorate.3 9 If the citi-
zenry is to exercise its veto power effectively in those instances in which
public officials abuse their trust,40 then a premium must be placed on
the ability of professional critics to disseminate information about the
behavior of the officials. 41 And as Blasi notes, "A proponent of the
checking value . . . places particular emphasis on the acquisition of
information." 42 But whether a given practice fosters the flow of infor-
mation to recipients is not the determinative consideration. 43 Rather,
journalistic autonomy from government is the apparent keystone to the
checking function. As "perhaps the most important implication of the
checking value,"44 jouralistic autonomy enables the professional critic
to "develop an internal ethos that emphasizes such qualities as inde-
pendence, vigor, innovativeness, and public responsibility. '45 It does
not necessarily follow that journalists are more objective if they have
the benefit of autonomy;46 indeed, they may be ardently partisan in
39. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 457 (1793) (opinion of Wilson, J.); J.
LocKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, supra note 16, § 1, at 338; § 149, at 426-27;
§§ 221-222, at 469-71; §§ 240-243, at 483-85; THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 339 (J. Madison) (J.
Cook ed. 1961); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), reparnted In 5
THm WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 272-73 (G. Hunt ed. 1904); Siebert, supra note 33, at 43.
40. Blasi did not envision a system by which it was necessary for the citizen to contribute on
a continuing basis to the formation of public policy. Blasi, supra note 20, at 542, 561-62; see D.
GILLMOR & J. BARRON, MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAW 17 (3d ed. 1979).
41. Blasi, supra note 20, at 609.
42. Id 603. Blasi made the remark in the context of advocating that the checking value
strengthens reporters' claims to a testimonial privilege. Id For elaboration on the potential bene-
fits of the checking value and its implications, see id 589 (elimination of vicarious liability for
defamation may promote publication of unconventional ideas which are encouraged by propo-
nents of checking value); id 603 (claim of testimonial privilege for reporters strengthened by
checking value which emphasizes acquisition of information); id 628-29 (right of introduction-in
addition to right to reply-may permit "critics of government to break through the mist of 'new-
speak' that tends to dull almost everyone's response to public events" and to promote the intro-
duction of new subjects of discussion). See generally id 631-32.
43. Professor Lillian BeVier advances a provocative argument that promoting the flow of
information should not be a significant consideration because the "right to know" finds no support
in constitutional principles. BeVier, An Informed Public, an Informing Press: The Searchfor a
Constitudional Princple, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 482, 500-10 (1980); see Dworkin, Is the Press Losing the
First lAmendaent?, THE NEw YORK REVIEw OF BOOKS 49, 51-52 (Dec. 4,1980).
44. Blasi, supra note 20, at 623. Elsewhere Blasi thought journalistic autonomy likely was a
"prime consideration" for most proponents of the checking value. Id 590.
45. Id 587.
46. The journalistic ethic of objectivity, as commonly understood, may be a disservice to the
reader who cannot read between the lines or assimilate sufficient material from other sources to
assess accurately the practical merit of a given position. It may not be enough for the press to
report only both sides of an issue because the press then fails to "evaluate for the reader the
trustworthiness of conflicting sources, [or to supply] the perspective essential to a complete under-
standing of a given situation." Peterson, supra note 26, at 88. To report events impartially, with-
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attacking what they perceive as governmental abuse.47
Independence from government has a symbolic value48 that may
help to engender in the press a self-image as a participant in the system
of checks and balances.49 By opining that nonregulation "should gen-
erate reportorial priorities that are determined more by a sense of pub-
lic responsibility than by a fetish for profit maximization," 50 Blasi
clearly opposes social-responsibility theorists who envision "a benevo-
lent government" establishing the ground rules51 to ensure dissemina-
tion of all appropriate facts and opinions.
The libertarian principle of independence may derive from several
first amendment values, but its roots seem most firmly entrenched in
the checking value. For no other value is independence so essential.
Perhaps, as social-responsibility proponents may argue, government in-
tervention facilitates the realization of diversity of expression. 52 But it
seems a fortiori impossible to contemplate any significant role for gov-
ernment if the focus is on the value of checking government.
2. Preeminence ofprivate interests. Likewise fundamental to lib-
ertarian theory is an emphasis on private rather than public interests.
The principle of the preeminence of private interests both shares and
out interpreting their significance or placing them in a context, may result in an "objective," yet
distorted picture. See T. CRousE, Tim Boys ON THE Bus 269-70, 323, 387-38, 392 (1972).
Arguably, objective truth--even if attainable-is distinguishable from news. W. LIPPMAN,
PUBLIC OPINION 226 (1965). Reporters may not see themselves reporting "truth," but rather fo-
cusing attention on aspects of a situation that an audience can most readily comprehend. See id
221-22. Such a focus necessarily yields a misrepresentation in the eyes of those who would have
interpreted the significance of the event differently. See id Thus understood, the ethic of objec-
tivity is violated not when the reporter emphasizes, simplifies, or appeals to stereotypes, but when
he deliberately fabricates without foundation in fact. The former may further the checking value,
but the latter furthers only the purpose of the reporter.
47. To give equal attention to the view being criticized by itself lends credibility to the con-
trary position. See A. BICKEL, Tim MORALIrY OF CONSENT 73 (1975). As Blasi notes,
[flor the process of checking official misconduct sometimes requires the press to behave
as a vigorous, unabashed partisan.. .. There may be, after all, occasions when the
attention of readers could be diverted by boring, confusing, or brilliantly demagogic
responses of officials who are being criticized by the press. Also, in a particular cam-
paign to expose official abuse, the morale of reporters and editors may depend on theirhaving control over the presentation of material and on not being sidetracked by the
need to respond to countercharges or other diversionary defenses. Thus, in some circum-
stances anrght of access may interfere with the partisan efforts of news organizations to
awaken the public conscience to the abuse of power by officials.
Blasi, supra note 20, at 624; see Bezanson, supra note 19, at 620. But see Blasi, supra note 20, at
625-27 (access by individuals who are not public officials promotes the checking value).
48. Blasi, upra note 20, at 625.
49. Id 624; see A. BicEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 87 (1975).
50. Blasi, supra note 20, at 624.
51. See text accompanying note 127 infra; see Siebert, infra note 56, at 29.
52. See Barron, supra note 19, at 1667-78; Nimmer, .pra note 1, at 645.
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contributes to the rationale for the independence principle, yet they are
two distinct principles.5 3 In resolving any problem in a way consonant
with libertarian ideals, one or the other may predominate.5 4 Whereas
the independence principle is founded largely on the philosophy of the
checking value, the private-interest principle flows primarily from the
libertarian values of individualism and self-fulfillment.
The happiness and well-being of the individual are the goals of
society, according to libertarian ideology.55 Libertarian doctrine varies
markedly from authoritarianism, 5 6 for example, in that the latter subor-
dinates all else to the interests of the state.57 Individuals depend on the
state to help them attain their full potential as components of a civi-
lized society.5 8 In a libertarian scheme, the state is only a means to
individual self-fulfillment.5 9 Individuals may dissolve any bonds that
exist between them and the state when they determine that the state no
longer serves their needs.60 In short, the state derives its authority from
the consent of the governed.61 The principle of the preeminence of
private interests defines the bounds within which the state may exercise
its delegated authority. Whether God-given62 or utilitarian,63 the rights
of the individual delimit the extent of the state's power.
53. Indeed, on occasion the principles may dictate conflicting results. See Bezanson, supra
note 1, at 765-71. The government's observance of strict neutrality with regard to media news
gathering, see id 754-56, 759-62, may be contrary to the private interests of the media. In such
cases of conflict, deference to the independence principle may better serve the private interests of
the media in the long run. See id 769.
54. See the discussion of prior restraints at text accompanying notes 82-86 infra.
55. Siebert, supra note 33, at 40.
56. Authoritarianism has much in common with social-responsibility theory. Siebert, The
Authoritarian Theory of the Press, in F. SIEBERT, T. PETERSON & W. SCHRAMM, FOUR THEORIES
OF THE PRESS 28-29 (1956); see J. MERRIL, THE IMPERATIVE OF FREFDoM-A PHILOSOPHY OF
JouRNtIsnc AUTONOMY 88, 92-93 (1974).
57. See Siebert, supra note 56, at 13.
58. SeeId 10-11.
59. As Professor Jay Jensen observed, liberalism contemplated
a natural opposition between the individual and society, a dichotomy which assumed
that individuals have discrete and independent existences apart from the society in which
they live, and which underpinned the "social contract" theory of the time that conceived
of society as comprising nothing but an aggregate of individual, autonomous wills, and
of government as an artifice created by their consent and for the protection of their
rights.
Jensen, Freedom of the Press: A Concept in Search e/a Philosophy, in SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF
THE NnwsPRFss 71, 77 (1962); see Siebert, supra note 33, at 40-41.
60. See J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, supra note 16, § 1, at 338;
§ 149, at 426-27; § 222, at 469-71; §§ 228-229, at 473-74.
61. See id §§ 96-97, at 395.
62. See id §§ 6-7, at 341-42; § 135, at 418.
63. See J.S. MILL, supra note 19, at 76: "In proportion to the development ofhis individual-
ity, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is, therefore, capable of being more valua-
ble to others." See id 141. But see notes 71-75 infra and accompanying text.
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In its fledgling state, there seemed to be a logical inconsistency in a
liberal philosophy that empowers the state to act "whither the greater
force carries it, which is the consent of the majority" a but that pre-
serves a realm of individual rights supposedly immune from state inter-
ference. John Stuart Mill later resolved this conundrum-at least for
libertarians-by deferring to individual rights and decrying the "tyr-
anny of the majority."65
Mill acknowledges an area within which the state may legitimately
act on behalf of the public interest,66 but he clearly evinces a disdain
for the potentially generous breadth of arguments that advance "social
rights":
So monstrous a principle is far more dangerous than any single
interference with liberty; there is no violation of liberty which it
would not justify; it acknowledges no right to any freedom whatever,
except perhaps to that of holding opinions in secret, without ever
disclosing them; for the moment an opinion which I consider noxious
passes anyone's lips, it invades all the "social rights" attributed to me
by the Alliance. The doctrine ascribes to all mankind a vested inter-
est in each other's moral, intellectual, and even physical perfection,
to be defined by each claimant according to his own standard.67
64. J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, supra note 16, § 96, at 395 (em-
phasis deleted); see A. STROLL & R. POPKIN, INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 198 (2d ed. 1972).
One author even asserts that Locke posited "a definition of political power so authoritarian and
collectivist in its bearing that no genuine individualist (e.g., Rousseau) could conceivably accept
it." W. KENDALL, supra note 29, at 66.
65. J.S. MILL, supra note 19, at 6-7.
The limitation, therefore, of the power of government over individuals loses none of
its importance when the holders of power are regularly accountable to the community,
that is, to the strongest party therein .... [I]n political speculations "the tyranny of the
majority" is now generally included among the evils against which society requires to be
on its guard.
Id See also THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison) (favoring a republic over a true democracy).
Mill even criticized resort to "the moral coercion of public opinion" when it intruded on the
legitimate exercise of individual rights. See J.S. MILL, supra note 19, at 13.
66. See J.S. MILL, supra note 19, at 67-68, 92.
A person should be free to do as he likes in his own concerns, but he ought not to be
free to do as he likes in acting for another, under the pretext that the affairs of the other
are his own affairs. The State, while it respects the liberty of each in what specially
regards himself, is bound to maintain a vigilant control over his exercise of any power
which it allows him to possess over others.
Id 127.
67. Id 109-10. It would be incorrect, however, to characterize Mill as unalterably opposed to
governmental impingement of individual liberty. When the exercise of liberty takes the form of
action rather than opinion, governmental restraint is more tolerable. J.S. MILL, supra note 19, at
67. Mill's perspective has the earmarks of Justice Holmes's clear and present danger test, see
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919), which has been criticized as offering too little
protection for expression. See, ag., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 611 (1978);
Blasi, supra note 20, at 647-48 ("A nagging paradox of First Amendment theory is that speech
advocating crime or revolution is protected only so long as it is ineffective; this is what the clear
and present danger test is all about"); Emerson, Towarda General Theory of the First 4mendment,
Vol 1982:1]
DUKE LAW JOUPITAL
Libertarian theory appears to assume 68 that individuals, possessed
of the liberty of expression, will avail themselves of their freedom;69
that, rightly or wrongly, individuals will espouse their sentiments in a
"free and open encounter" out of which participants will discern the
truth.70 Mill seemingly grounds his defense of individual liberty of ex-
pression on the beliefs that truth would be distilled and tested in an
unfettered exchange of ideas and that free individual expression thus
evinces social utility.71 But Mill goes beyond social utility in defending
individual expression. He identifies "absolute freedom of opinion and
sentiment" as "almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought
itself and resting in great part on the same reasons, [and thus] practi-
cally inseparable from it.'"72
For liberty of expression to be considered in the same breath as
liberty of thought is no inconsequential comparison. Surely liberty of
72 YALE L. 877, 910-12 (1963) (test allows only innocuous expression and is vague and impossi-
ble to administer faithfully); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment andEvIls that Congress Has a Right
to Prevent, 26 IND. LJ. 477, 477-78 (1951); Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger'"
From Schenck to Brandenburg-and Beyond, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 41, 41-44.
It is clear that Mill did not contemplate absolute protection of liberty from governmental
restraint, especially when the individual affects others. See J.S. MILl, supra note 19, at 13, 68, 92.
It may be more correct to characterize Mill as objecting to "excesses of governmental interven-
tion." Shields, Introduction to J.S. MILl, supra note 19, at xix (emphasis in original). Dean Je-
rome Barron observed that Mill's "writing reveals that, although the power he knew was
government, it was fear of power more than fear of government which animated his thought." J.
BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? 82 (1973).
In the final analysis, although Mill indeed may have approved the legitimacy of some meas-
ure of state control over the individual, he clearly placed the presumption in favor of individual
interests and imposed the burden on the state to prove the necessity of interference with those
interests. See A. STROLL & R. POpKIW, INTRODucTION TO PmLOSOPHY 202 (2d ed. 1972).
[The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfer-
ing with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. That the only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
,community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical
or moral, is not sufficient warrant.
J.S. MILL, supra note 19, at 13.
68. Indeed, the theory may impose an obligation to speak.
69. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Peterson,
supra note 26, at 99.
70. See note 21 supra. There may also be an assumption that the ideas are available to the
jersons who actively seek them and are able to comprehend them. Thomas Jefferson, for exam-
ple, is often quoted as declaring that "were it left to me to decide whether we should have a
government without newspapers or newspapers without government, I should not hesitate to pre-
fer the latter." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington (Jan. 16, 1787), reprinted in
part in INTERPRETATIONS OF JOURNALISM 52 (F. Mott & R. Casey eds. 1937). But in a statement
of perhaps greater significance, he added that "every man should receive those papers & be capa-
ble of reading them." Id; see Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Charles Yancey (Jan. 6, 1816),
refprinted in 14 THE WRITINoS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 384 (Definitive ed., A. Bergh ed. 1907)
("Where the press is free, and every man able to read, all is safe").
71. See J.S. MILL, supra note 19, at 64.
72. Id 16;seeid 18.
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thought must be the last bastion of security from societal intrusion.73
For Mill the societal good is ultimately defined as the sum of all indi-
viduals' benefits. Mill's defense of a single individual's freedom to dis-
agree with an opinion held by "all mankind minus one" evinces a
solicitude for the interests of that lone dissenter that does not extend to
the invocations of the social utility of dissent.74 "The press" is a misno-
mer in this libertarian scheme. The press should be viewed not as a
public institution, but as a group of individuals each having a point of
view to sell in the marketplace of ideas. The preeminence of private
interests and its meaning for the press perhaps is best summarized in
these thoughts of William Peter Hamilton of the Wall Street Journal:
"A newspaper is a private enterprise owing nothing whatever to the
public, which grants it no franchise. It is therefore affected with no
public interest. It is emphatically the property of the owner, who is
selling a manufactured product at his own risk. '75
73. See text accompanying note 67.
Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the pub-
lic: to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if he publishes what is
improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temer-
i.ty.... Thus the will of individuals is still left free; the abuse only of that free will is
the object of legal punishment. Neither Is any restraint hereby laid upon freedom of
thought or inquiry: liberty ofprivate sentiment is still left; the disseminating, or making
public, of bad sentiments, destructive of the ends of society, is the crime which society
corrects.
4 W. BLACKSrONE, CosvmnNT1ARIus *152 (emphasis added).
74. Mill identified benefits to the individual wholly apart from those accruing to the society.
See J.S. Mii, supra note 19, at 45 (benefits to the individual of knowing the truth); id 82 (of
cultivation of higher life); id 93, 100-02 (in directing one's own life); id 133-34 (of spurning state
intervention even when the aim is to help rather than to hinder). See generally G. SABINE, A
HISTORY OF POLrrcAL THEORY 708-09 (rev. ed. 1950). Professor Thomas Emerson elaborated on
this theme when he noted that
it is not a general measure of the individual's right to freedom of expression that any
particular exercise of the right may be thought to promote or retard other goals of the
society. The theory asserts that freedom of expression.. . is a good in itself, or at least
an essential element in a good society.
T. EMERSON, supra note 19, at 8.
75. Quoted in Peterson, supra note 26, at 73. Press pundit AJ. Liebling expressed a similar
sentiment in a more blunt fashion: "Freedom of the press is guaranteed only to those who own
one." Liebling, Do You Belong in Journalism, in THE PREss 30 (1961) (parentheses omitted). See
United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 376-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (Swan, J., dissenting)
(business of gathering news not recognized at common law as affected with a public interest), afl'd,
326 U.S. 1 (1945); cf. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 140-41 (1877) (Field, 3., dissenting) (because
the public has an interest in a business-including the publishing business-does not clothe that
business with a public interest). But see Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment
Right, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1641, 1666 (1967); Media and the First Amendment in a Free Society, 60
GEO. L. 867, 906-07 (1972).
The framers of the Constitution accorded individuals maximum freedom to pursue their pri-
vate interests through expression because they regarded freedom of the press "as a more or less
absolute right, a liberty subject only to individual reason and conscience and to the minimal post-
Vol. 1982:1]
DUKE L4WJOURNAL [Vol. 1982:1
3. Implementation of libertarianprinc#iles. The libertarian princi-
ples of independence from government and preeminence of private in-
terests pervade United States Supreme Court opinions concerning the
first amendment rights of the media.76 The principles often comple-
ment each other, yet one or the other can be seen as governing the
outcome in any given case. The conflict between the press and govern-
ment can be classified into two categories: cases in which government
tries to dictate what must be published and cases in which government
tries to dictate what may not be published. The independence principle
is the more useful one in analyzing the latter cases. For example, in
Grosjean v. American Press Co. 77 Louisiana imposed a tax on newspa-
pers with circulations over 20,000 in the hope that the state's largest
newspapers, critical of Governor Huey Long, would be silenced.78 In
striking down the tax, the Court elaborated on the historical abuse of
such taxes by the English government in its attempts to subjugate dissi-
publication restraints of a free society composed of autonomous individuals possessing similar and
equal rights." Jensen, supra note 59, at 79.
Of course, it may be argued that the self-interest of the newspaper owner indirectly contrib-
utes to the common good. Cf. I A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 456 (R. Campbell, A.
Skinner & W. Todd eds. 1976) (Ist ed. London 1776) (book IV, ch. 2 of the first edition) (although
not concerned with the societal benefits of free expression, Smith noted there may be general
benefits to society flowing from the pursuit of self-interest).
76. Indeed, Supreme Court opinions may be one of the last bastions of liberalism; many
consider liberalism to be a concept in crisis. F. WATKINS, supra note 2, at ix; Jensen, supra note
59, at 75.
In the liberalistie quests for "freedom under law," F. WATKINS, supra note 2, at x, a potential
paradox may exist because resort to the law inevitably restricts freedom by delimiting its scope.
Professor Alexander Bickel alluded to this characteristic of law when he observed, "Those free-
doms which are neither challenged nor defined are the most secure." A. BIcKE., THE MORALITY
OF CONSENT 60 (1975). He added that the press can thus be understood to have been freer before
it won the Pentagon Papers case because its freedom from prior restraint by federal fiat had not
been tested. The press had an "assumed freedom which appeared limitless because its limits were
untried." Id 61.
Incessant resort to legal institutions is arguably antitheical to the liberal precept that an
individual enjoys "a minimum of dependence on the discretionary authority of his rulers," F.
WATKINS, supra note 2, at x. See J. MERRILL, supra note 56, at iv (quoting from speech by Judge
Learned Hand in New York City in 1944):
What do we mean when we say that first of all we seek liberty? I often wonder whether
we do not rest our hopes too much upon constitutions, upon laws and upon courts.
These are false hopes; believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty lies in the hearts of men
and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it. . . .While
it lies there it needs no constitution, no law, no court to save it.
See id 206; Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "he Central Meaning of the First
Amendment," 1964 Su'. CT. REv. 191, 221 ("We are reminded... of the arresting problem how
much freedom of speech in a legal system must depend on law's conscious distrust of its own
processes to make needed discriminations").
77. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
78. See M. FRANKLIN, supra note 17, at 93. All but one of the papers affected had strongly
opposed the Governor's actions. Id
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dents.79 Justice Sutherland, writing for the Court, relied heavily on the
checking value80 of free expression, and concluded that the imposition
of a financial burden by government may inhibit criticism of
,misgovernment."81
The issue in all cases of prior restraint-however subtle govern-
ment's restraint may be--can be characterized as follows: does the
government or the speaker determine whether information will be dis-
seminated?8 2 In this context, the principle of the preeminence of pri-
vate interests over public interests is important because it denies
government its most powerful justification for the right to decide the
issue. The preeminence principle rests, in part, on deference to the in-
dividuars interest in speaking. Government's right to subordinate the
individuars interest to its own rests on the following premises: first,
that government best embodies the public interest; and second, that pri-
vate interests should be subordinated to the public interest.83 Ac-
79. 297 U.S. at 245-49.
80. See text accompanying note 52 supra. The independence principle may well be the key
element of the checking function.
81. 297 U.S. at 250; see id at 246-47.
82. For example, the result in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979), surely
did not turn on an analysis of the interests in the content at issue because such an analysis would
compel a conclusion requiring abridgement of the speech. See id at 107-09 (Rehnquist, J., con-
curring); Comment, Freedom of the Press vs. Juvenile Anonymity: A Conflict Between Constitutional
Priorities and Rehabilitation, 65 IowA L. REv. 1471 (1980).
Unlike Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 833, 835-36, 838-42 (1978), a
similar case that preceded Daily Mail, the Court in Daily Mail did not offer a single interest
favoring the dissemination of a juvenile's name or analyze in any detail the interests favoring
restriction of the speech. The only satisfactory analysis of Daily Mail is that the Court, when
confronted with the question of whether the government's judgment should be substituted for that
of the press, relied on the principle of independence from government in deferring to the press.
The principle required that government demonstrate "the highest form of state interest," 443 U.S.
at 102; see id at 103-04, before the insulation between government and press could be breached.
A potential incursion on the independence principle is presented by the mere submission of
disputes to the judiciary-a coordinate branch of government. If "freedom under law," see note
76 supra, is integral to liberalism, though, some forum is necessary for dispute resolution in which
the result is binding. The competence of the courts to fulfill this role "rests upon their indepen-
dence from other branches of government, their relative immunity to immediate political and
popular pressures, the training and quality of their personnel, their utilization of legal procedures,
and their powers of judicial review." T. EMERSON, supra note 19, at 13.
Upon occasion, however, when the press has felt its independence threatened-as when it
perceived itself being used as an investigative arm of government, see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 725 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting)-it has evinced a willingness to protect its freedom by
relying on its own interpretation of the law. See Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical
Study, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 229, 258 (1971). Even submitting to in camera judicial review may be
subject to objection. See New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1304, 1305 (1978) (in
chambers opinion of Marshall, J.). See also J. MERRILL, supra note 56, at 204.
83. See United States v. Snepp, 456 F. Supp. 176, 182 (E.D. Va. 1978), ad in part and rev'd
inpart, 595 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'dinpart, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam). Often it may
be more illuminating to view the government as acting in its own interest to prevent release of
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cepting the second premise denies the preeminence principle much of
its strength.
Although the principle of preeminence of private interests supplies
key support for the individual's claim to the right to control his
speech,84 the independence principle predominates nevertheless. Even
if one accepts that the public interest is paramount, few would agree
that government was a monopoly to define this interest. The checking
value retains, therefore, much of its vitality. In no other area is the
independence of the speaker so crucial or so threatened as when that
speaker attempts to address subjects that incur the displeasure of gov-
ernment.85 By their very nature, all attempts at prior restraint contra-
vene the principle of independence: the government is second-guessing
the speaker's judgment. The interest of the public may or may not ac-
cord with the private interest of the speaker, but the independence of
the speaker unquestionably is compromised if a prior restraint is
information that is embarrassing. See, ag., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
724 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring); United States v. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 330
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam); A. BICIEL, THE
MoRALrTY OF CONSENT 68-69 (1975); cf. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 993-
95 (W.D. Wis.) (classified information may be compiled from unclassified sources), appeal dis-
missed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979). The government has also evinced a sensitivity to criticism,
even when the criticism is unclassified, see United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 931 (4th Cir.
1979), rev'd inpart, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam). See also D. WisE, THE POLMCS OF Ly-
iNG-GOVERNMENT DECEPTION, SECRECY, AND PowER 234 (1973).
84. The private interest of the speaker has been pivotal in some prior restraint cases where
the public interest might counsel against allowing dissemination of the information. See, e.g.,
Near v. Minnesota exrel Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (publication of scandalous, defamatory mate-
rial); Wilson v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 652, 119 Cal. Rptr. 468, 532 P.2d 116 (1975) (publica-
tion of material arguably harmful to electoral process). Recognition of a dichotomy between prior
restraint and subsequent punishment was seen by Blackstone as an appropriate accommodation of
the individual interest in expression. See note 73 supra. But cf 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA-
Rms 153 n.15 (T. Cooley 3d ed. rev. 1884) (footnote by Cooley) (doubtful whether subsequent
criminal prosecutions serve beneficial purpose; excesses of press best restrained by public senti-
ment and jury awards in libel cases). Blackstone was an ardent advocate of private interests. See
D. BOORsTIN, THE MysTmuous SCIENCE OF THE LAW 162-63 (1941). The dichotomy between
prior restraint and subsequent punishment apparently retains its vitality. See New York Times
Co. v. United States 403 U.S. 713, 737 (1971) (White, J., concurring). But see Smith v. Daily Mail
Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101-02 (1979).
85. Professor Blasi chose the following passage as representative of the checking value:
The Government's power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would re-
main forever free to censure the Government. The press was protected so that it could
bare the secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained
press can effectively expose deception in government. And paramount among the re-
sponsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the government from
deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and
foreign shot and shell.
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring), quotedin
Blasi, supra note 20, at 649.
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imposed.86
Perhaps it is not so clear that the independence principle is under-
mined when the government seeks to confer a benefit rather than to
impose burdens. Professor Randall Bezanson argues cogently, how-
ever, by analogy to the establishment clause of the first amendment, 87
that even attempts by government to facilitate expression may have
several deleterious consequences for press independence. Such at-
tempts may engender fear that what is given may be withdrawn,8 8 may
enable government to oversee the press's use of the privilege,8 9 and
may foster a symbiotic relationship between press and government that
would deter full investigation.90 Bezanson notes that "any special gov-
ernmental assistance for the press may undermine [the press's] credibil-
ity."' 91 It would have been detrimental to the press, he suggests, to have
gained the testimonial privilege it sought in Branzburg v. Hayes,92 be-
cause the privilege would have been a special governmental benefit not,
enjoyed by the public at large.93 Conferral of such benefits94 poses an
insidious threat to the independence principle because it creates a role
86. See generally Bezanson, supra note 1, at 762-65.
87. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Bezanson, supra note 1, at 732; cf L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTOiNAL LAW 590 n.8 (1978) (questioning different analyses of taxpayer suits depending on
whether objection is to compel payment of tax for state promotion of speech or for state promo-
tion of religion).
88. The Washington Post editorialized against shield-law legislation for similar reasons. The
Problem of "Shield Laws," Wash. Post, Mar. 25, 1974, at A20, col. 1.
89. See Zimmerman, Overcoming Future Shock- Estes Revisited, or a Modest Proposalfor the
ConstitutionalProtection of the News-Gathering Process, 1980 DUKE L.J. 641, 701-03; EDITOR AND
PUBLISHER, Sept. 13, 1975, at 15.
90. Bezanson, supra note 1, at 734; see 2 Z. CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMU-
NICATIONs 475-77 (1947). Chafee notes that the risks of affirmative governmental activity include
unintended, ancillary effects that may be counter-productive, the potential for governmental dis-
crimination in deciding who is to reap the benefits of its largesse, and the tendency of government
to increase its influence by increasing the scope of its intervention. Id
The common practice of leaking information to reporters, as described by Charles Peters,
editor of The Washington Monthly, can be understood as a benefit conferred at a price. A symbi-
otic relationship forms because the publication of information can benefit both the reporter and
the source. See C. PETERS, How WASHINGTON REALLY WORKS 25.-26 (1980). Peters notes, how-
ever, that "[tlhis kind of interdependence weakens a reporter's objectivity and heightens his sus-
ceptibility to manipulation." Id 26. The potential for manipulation exists with nongovernmental
sources as well, but their motives seem to be beyond the purview of a constitutional amendment
designed to limit government conduct. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 730 (1972) (Stew-
art, J., dissenting). But see id at 691 (White, J.).
91. Bezanson, supra note I, at 734.
92. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
93. Bezanson, supra note 1, at 761.
94. The independence of the press as defined in Bezanson's analysis was also at issue in
KQED, Inc. v. Houchins, 546 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 438 U.S. 1 (1978), see Bezanson,
supra note I, at 769, as well as in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) and in Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
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for government in a process that should be as free as possible from
government influence.
John Stuart Mill expressed similar reservations when he addressed
government intervention on behalf of individuals. He objected to such
governmental interference because generally government is more inept
than private enterprise95 and because the diversity of individual contri-
butions would be stifled by a pervasive, monolithic influence.96 But a
"third and most cogent reason" for maintaining independence from
government, even when it proffered a benefit rather than a burden, is
the great evil of adding unnecessarily to its power. Every function
superadded to those already exercised by the government causes its
influence over hopes and fears to be more widely diffused, and con-
verts, more and more, the active and ambitious part of the public into
hangers-on of the government, or of some party which aims at be-
coming the government. If the roads, the railways, the banks, the
insurance offices, the great joint-stock companies, the universities,[971
and the public charities were all of them branches of the government
• . . not all the freedom of the press and popular constitution of the
legislature would make this or any other country free otherwise than
in name.98
Moreover, in cases in which the government seeks to bestow a
right on the press, often a new duty may be imposed as well.99 If the
press accepts a right the public does not have, most often one may infer
a duty of the press to act on behalf of the public when exercising the
newly bestowed right. The cases in which the government seeks to im-
pose and to enforce a "public duty" on the press-in most instances a
duty to print information-are best analyzed as determined by the
principle of the preeminence of private rights.
Although both government and publisher can rely on public-inter-
est arguments to buttress their positions in a case of prior restraint, the
public interest is aligned more clearly against the publisher in resolving
prepublication questions of compelled access.' 00 The contribution of
the private interest to the result is delineated more starkly when the
publisher asserts a right not to speak rather than a right to speak. Thus,
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court in Miami Herald Publishing
95. J.S. MILL, supra note 19, at 133.
96. 1d 133-34.
- 97. See generall, Moynihan supra note 35, at 31.
98. J.S. MILL, supra note 19, at 134-35. Jose Ortega y Gasset elaborated on a similar theme
when he noted that the greatest danger to mass civilization is the tendency to demand that the
state intervene and undertake the solution of all problems with its "immense and unassailable
resources." J. ORTEGA Y GAssET, THE REVOLT OF THE MASSES 132 (1932).
99. See notes 287-89 infra and accompanying text.
100. See Barron, supra note 19, at 1654-55, 1678; Lange, The Role of lheAccess Doctrine in the
Regulation of the Mass Media: A Critical Review andAssessment, 52 N.C.L. REv. 1, 9 (1973).
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Co. v. Tornillo,1° 1 forthrightly set out these private interests: "'The
power of a privately owned newspaper to advance its own political,
social, and economic views is bounded by only two factors: first, the
acceptance of a sufficient number of readers-and hence advertisers-
to assure financial success; and, second, the journalistic integrity of its
editors and publishers.' "102
In a more abstract sense, the private interest of the newspaper is
the self-fulfillment that the Miami Herald gains in communicating its
assessment of a candidate for public office. The editors of the Miami
Herald can use their forum to wage a vigorous campaign for a course
of action that they believe is in the best interest of themselves and the
community, secure in the knowledge that their forum will not be a ve-
hicle for contrary, and what they may consider ill-conceived, ideas. 103
Pat Tornillo may have been the best candidate, but at issue in Miami
Herald was the newspaper's right to urge otherwise-without contra-
diction in its own columns. In a unanimous opinion the Court con-
cluded that, for better or worse, the exercise of editorial judgment is
best left within private control. °4 Chief Justice Burger adverted to the
potential for abuse if publishers are left to pursue their private inter-
ests,105 but rejected the alternative10 6 as in the long run even more det-
rimental to first amendment values.' 0 7
101. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). The Court in Miami Herald can be viewed as having acted on the
independence principle in holding unconstitutional a governmental attempt to facilitate individ-
ual expression by mandating access to newspapers. Individuals seeking access to such forums may
be better off in the long run if the government refrains from choosing specific causes to promote.
If the government is to "force a newspaper to print copy which, in its journalistic discretion, it
chooses to leave on the newsroom floor," id at 261 (White, J., concurring), the burden imposed on
the press further contravenes the independence principle. The principle that receives substantial
emphasis in Miami Herald, however, involves the preeminence of private interests.
102. 418 U.S. at 255 (quoting CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973) (plu-
rality opinion)).
103. See note 47 supra.
104. 418 U.S. at 258.
105. Id at 248-54.
106. Id at 254.
107. Id at 257; see id at 259-61 (White, J., concurring).
For better or worse, editing is what editors are for, and editing is selection and choice of
material. That editors-newspaper or broadcast--can and do abuse this power is be-
yond doubt .... Calculated risks of abuse are taken in order to preserve higher values.
The presence of these risks is nothing new; the authors of the Bill of Rights accepted the
reality that these risks were evils for which there was no acceptable remedy other than a
spirit of moderation and a sense of responsibility-and civility--on the part of those who
exercise the guaranteed freedoms of expression.
CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124-25 (1973). Bezanson's analysis of develop-
ments in libel revealed libertarian principles as controlling, see Bezanson, supra note 1, at 740-51,
although his analysis was for the purpose of distinguishing the speech and press clauses. See id
748-51.
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B. Soc'al-Responsibility Theory of the Press.
Although the social-responsibility theory's origins are diverse,10 8
the report of the Commission of Freedom of the Press published in
1947109 is the theory's key treatise and marks the birth of the theory.110
Heavily criticized by the press,"' the report, also known as the Hutch-
ins Commission Report, has had an increasingly significant, albeit sub-
tle, impact on the press and on society. I 2
The arguments favoring a news-gathering right rely mainly on the
need of the public to be informed. 13 This need exists because demo-
cratic government requires a knowledgeable citizenry if the citizenry is
to exercise its franchise in a principled manner." 4 Proponents of liber-
tarian and social-responsibility theories are in accord on the premise
that the maximum flow of information is a desirable end,"*5 but they
disagree on the means of achieving that end. Libertarians view auton-
omy from government and emphasis of private interests as most effec-
tive in encouraging expression, but social-responsibility advocates
assert that the implementation of those principles has yielded unsatis-
factory results." 6 Freedom of expression is endangered unless liberta-
rian precepts are abandoned, according to the report of the Hutchins
108. Though the report of the Commission on Freedom of the Press and the Commission's
other publications were published in the late 1940s, the principles recognized in those publications
previously received attention. Considerable pressure on the press to promote society's interests
rather than its own had been exerted beginning with the socio-economic reform movement of the
1930s. See M. BLANCHARD, supra note 1, at 3-9. There are numerous remarks on the relevance of
public interests and the rights of the audience in the literature from this period. See United States
v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 370-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), a i'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); L. BER-
GREEN, LOOK Now, PAY LATER-THE RISE OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 46 (1980) (text of
RCA advertisements from 1926); H. ICKES, AMERICA'S HOUSE OF LORDS 160, 162-63, 166 (1939);
Booth, The Freedom of the Press, in ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
WORCESTER FIRE SOCIETY 16, 19 (1943); Ernst, Freedom to Read, See, and Hear, HARPER'S
MAO., July 1945, at 51.
109. COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS (1947) [here-
inafter cited as COMMISSION].
110. See Jensen, supra note 59, at 79; Peterson, supra note 26, at 75.
111. H. NELSON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM HAMILTON TO THE WARREN COURT at xli-
xlii (1967).
112. See M. BLANCHARD, supra note I, at 51-52. "'A chief service of the volume is that it
makes criticism of the press respectable."' Id at 48 (quoting Liebling, Review, THE NATION, Apr.
12, 1947, at 427).
113. See Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862-64 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725-27 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
114. See BeVier, supra note 43, at 482.
115. Compare J.S. MILL, supra note 19, at 64 and note 21 supra with COMMISSION, supra note
109, at 36 (more information, not less, is the optimum).
116. See COMMISSION, supra note 109, at 15-17; W. RIVERS, W. SCHRAMM & C. CHRISTIANS,
RESPONSIBILITY IN MASS COMMUNICATIONS 44-45 (3d ed. 1980); Peterson, supra note 26, at 74,
78-79.
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Commission." 7 The lack of "positive" freedom,'1 and the selfish aims
of powerful, concentrated media have created a climate detrimental to
the public in which first amendment values are not being realized." 9
When a few exercise control over the freedom of speech "in such a way
as not to supply the people with the service they require, the freedom of
the minority.. . is in danger."'120 Social-responsibility advocates cau-
tion that government intervention poses its own dangers, but nonethe-
less they differ markedly from their libertarian counterparts by
assigning an "important part" to government in the realization of free-
dom of expression. 121 Government may intervene, however, only to
facilitate freedom of expression that benefits the public. 22
1. Government intervention. Self-regulation is the ideal in a so-
cial-responsibility scheme,' 23 but according to the Commission, the
fruits of self-regulation have been disappointing. 24 The substantive
deficiencies 25 of the "news" purveyed by mass media demonstrate the
fallacy of relying solely on the unregulated initiative of the private sec-
tor.126 As one commentator wrote, social-responsibility theory contem-
plates "some form of control, preferably by the media themselves with
a benevolent government in the background unobtrusively checking
the ground rules."'127
117. COMMISSION, supra note 109, at 1-2; see id 80.
118. See notes 142-54 inra and accompanying text.
119. See COMMISSION, supra note 109, at 1-2.
120. Id 2; see id 60, 80.
121. Id 2-3, 4-5, 7-8. See Siebert, The Authoritarian Theory ofthe Press, in F. SIEBERT, T.
PETERSON & W. ScHR m, FouR THEORIS OF THE PRESS 29 (1956). Professor Jensen aptly
summarized the distinctive attitudes toward government that characterize theories of liberalism
and social responsibility-which he termed "neo-liberalism"-when he noted that although the
former "held the state in contempt and fear, the position of neo-Liberalism is that government can
and should be both protector and promoter of the freedom of the press." Jensen, supra note 59, at
83; see J. MERRILL, supra note 56, at 37.
122. See CoMMIssION, supra note 109, at 8, 18, 127 app.
123. Id 3, 69, 90-91.
124. Id 1, 17, 54-62, 103-05, 124 app. Much of the Commission's criticism is qualitative:
[N]eeds are not being met. The news is twisted by the emphasis on firstness, on the novel
and sensational- by the personal interests of owners; and by pressure groups. Too much
of the regular output of the press consists of a miscellaneous succession of stories and
images which have no relation to the typical lives of real people anywhere. Too often the
result is meaninglessness, flatness, distortion, and the perpetuation of misunderstanding
among widely scattered groups whose only contact is through these media.
... When we look at the press as a whole.., we must conclude that it is not
meeting the needs of our society. The Commission believes that this failure of the press
is the greatest danger to its freedom.
Id 68.
125. See note 124 supra.
126. CoMIssIoN, supra note 109, at 125 app.
127. Siebert, supra note 56, at 29; see Z. CHAEE, JR., supra note 90, at 547 (Chafee was a
member of the Commission); F. SmEERT, upra note 1, at 12. The faith of social-responsibility
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Government intervention is necessary because the mere absence of
restraint is thought inadequate to ensure freedom of expression. 128
Some modicum of restraint on freedom is necessary to accommodate
the exercise of freedoms by others in civil society. 129 Unlimited free-
dom of expression can impinge on rights of privacy, 130 the right not to
hear,131 and various other private rights, as well as vital social inter-
ests.132 But more to the point, freedom of expression is subject to limi-
tation because the freedom extends only as far as its underlying
rationale. 133 In a social-responsibility scheme, freedom of expression is
conditioned on fulfilling a duty to the common good and to one's own
thoughts. 34 The former is shirked if the press provides inadequate or
contaminated information; 35 the latter is abdicated if one's expression
does not comport with one's thoughts-that is, if one deliberately
lies.' 36 With duties and responsibilities come accountability, and with
accountability comes government intervention. 37
Far from being considered the "chief foe of liberty" as under liber-
theorists in the performance of government is exemplified by the admonition of the Commission
that government "should enter the field of press comment and news supply," and, thus, perhaps
"present standards for private emulation." COMMISSION, supra note 109, at 128 app.; see id 5 n.l,
8. But see id 4-5.
128. Indeed, one school of philosophy holds that there can be no freedom without restraint.
See W. HOCKING, supra note 23, at 66-69; R. PERRY, PURITANISM AND DE.MOCRACY 521-23
(1944).
129. Professor Ralph Barton Perry observed:
The most serious hindrance to a man's interest is the rival interest of his neighbor.
Suffering or fearing this hindrance, he must postpone his interest until the hindrance is
removed. This is why war becomes every man's first business. It is clear that the only
permanent remedy lies in the systematic delimitation of interests. There is a greater
liberty to be enjoyed through the acceptance of such delimitation than through the unre-
strained assertion of a claim of limitlessness.
If this is reasonable, then it is evident to all men in proportion as they are endowed
with reason; and they will proceed accordingly to restrain liberty for the sake of liberty.
R. PERRY, PURITANISM AND DEMOCRACY 522 (1944).
130. W. HOCKING, supra note 23, at 71 n.14.
131. See COMMISSION, supra note 109, at III app.
132. Peterson, supra note 26, at 97-99; see W. HOCKING, supra note 23, at 112, 120-26.
133. See COMMISSION, supra note 109, at 10; W. HOCKING, supra note 23, at 120-26.
134. COMMISSION, supra note 109, at 10; W. HOCKING, supra note 23, at 109. Hocking posited
that only liberty of thought is an unconditional right that is incapable of being abridged because
society cannot reach it. W. HOCKING, supra note 23, at 72. See also text accompanying notes 72-
73 supra. Such a position seems i - sistent with his views on "positive" freedom in the realm of
thought. See W. HOCKING, supra n..e 23, at 54-55. The need for "means to achieve the end" of
thought seems no less when dealing with liberty of thought than when dealing with any other
liberty. Professor Perry, for example, noted that the liberty of thought that is "indestructible in its
negative aspect is no liberty at all without the capacity to think, and that it is therefore nullified by
mental disease, habit, indoctrination, hysteria, or lack of education." R. PERRY, PURITANISM AND
DEMOCRACY 514 (1944).
135. COMMISSION, supra note 109, at 125 app.
136. Id 10, 87.
137. See id 125-28 app.
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tarian precepts, 138 government is the "first line of defense" for press
freedom in a social-responsibility setting.' 39 Social-responsibility ad-
vocates point out that government is the only entity capable of main-
taining the public order, which is a prerequisite to free expression.14o
Moreover, having overcome much of the suspicion toward government
that characterizes libertarian thinking, 41 social-responsibility theorists
assert that government can play a positive role in the field of expres-
sion.142 Government is called on to ensure that the press is free-as
defined in social responsibility terms-to accomplish the ends for
which its freedom was intended. 43
Relying on notions of "positive" as opposed to "negative" free-
dom, 44 social-responsibility proponents view government intervention
as enabling achievement of true freedom. Just as a child left in the
middle of a desert is free from all constraints, but lacks positive free-
dom to accomplish anything but starvation, 45 freedom from govern-
Implicit in this trend toward "social responsibility" is the argument that some group
(obviously a judicial or governmental one, ultimately) can and must define or decide
what is socially responsible ...
Many persons will object to this line of analysis and will say that "social responsibil-
ity" of the press of a nation does not necessarily imply government control I contend'
that ultimately it does, since if left to be defined by various publishers or journalistic
groups the term is quite relative and nebulous; and it is quite obvious that in the tradi-
tional context of American libertarianism no "solution" that would be widely agreed
upon or practiced could ever be reached by non-government groups or individuals.
J. MERRILL, supra note 56, at 91-92.
138. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
139. COMMISSION, supra note 109, at 115 app. See note 121 supra.
140. COMMISSION, supra note 109, at 114 app.
141. See W. HOCKING, supra note 23, at 11.
142. The Commission noted that active governmental involvement is not necessarily antitheti-
cal to a system founded primarily on private enterprise, as exemplified by governmental control of
the post office. See COMMIssION, supra note 109, at 81. But see Associated Third Class Mail
Users v. United States Postal Serv., 600 F.2d 824, 825 n.3 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S 837
(1979); United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 490 F. Supp. 157, 159-61
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 2676 (1981). See also W. HoCKING, slpra note 23, at 188-89:
"The state is, in its nature, the greatest instrument for achieving the common purposes of the
human community."
143. See W. HocKING, supra note 23, at 183-84, 197.
144. Peterson, supra note 26, at 93-94; see COMMISSION, supra note 109, at 18-19; A.
MIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GoVERNMENT 16-17 (1948); Chafee,
Freedom of Speech ,4s I See It Today, 18 JOURNALIsM Q. 158, 158 (1941). See also I. BERLIN,
Two CONCEP'rs OF LIBERTY 6-19 (1958).
145. H. MULLER, ISSUES OF FREEDOM: PARADOXES AND PROMISES 7 (1960); see R. PERRY,
PURITANISM AND DEMOCRACY 525-26 (1944):
If it be the duty of government to promote the liberty of every man within its juris-
diction, this duty must be construed to embrace positive and not merely negative liberty.
If a man is to do what he desires, wills, or believes to be his duty, he must possess the
means, and not merely the permission ...
... If you cast a man into stormy waters far from land and tell him that there is
nothing to prevent his swimming to shore, there is clearly something lacking in his lib-
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mental restrictions "is now not enough to guarantee that a man who
has something to say shall have a chance to say it.'146 The state in a
social-responsibility scheme is ultimately responsible for adequate
press performance. 147 If no forum exists for citizens to initiate or to
join public debate, 148 then government must remedy the situation. 149
Likewise, if concentration of media 50 or other monopolistic tenden-
cies 51 impair the free flow of information to the public, then govern-
ment has cause to intervene, albeit delicately, so as not to impose on the
press a hardship that ultimately disserves the public.152
The press has no defense to these governmental incursions because
under this theory the press has freedom only to fulfil its social responsi-
bilities; 53 when it ceases fulfilling those responsibilities, its freedom
ceases as well. 154
erty ... The man who demands "effective personal freedom" wants to be put on shore
to start with.
146. COMMISSION, supra note 109, at 16. It is incorrect, however, to characterize libertarians
as ignorant of the possibilities of positive freedom in expanding individual potential. As Watkins
noted, "Genuine respect for the individual involves a sense of responsibility for the equalization
of social opportunities." F. WATKINS, supra note 2, at 250. Mill, for example, saw a role for
government, see id at 250-52, but distinguished himself from later social-responsibility theorists
by his concurrent, intense skepticism of government's predisposition to abuse its power in ful-
filling that role. See text accompanying note 98 supra.
147. W. HOCKING, supra note 23, at 182.
148. For discussion of such forums, see COMMISSION, supra note 109, at 23-25; A.
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 144, at 26.
149. See COMMISSION, supra note 109, at 127 app.; W. HOCKING, supra note 23, at 184-86; A.
MEIKLEjOHN, supra note 144, at 16-17.
150. See COMMISSION, supra note 109, at 17.
151. See W. HOCKING, supra note 23, at 171-74.
152. COMMISSION, supra note 109, at 83-85. Ironically, government may itself be the cause of
monpolistic or anticompetitive practices. See 1 Monopoly Problems in RepulatedIndustries: Hear-
ings Refore the Antitrust Subcomm of the House Coma on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 61-
64 (1956) (statement of Marver H. Bernstein); 1 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION NET-
WORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, FINAL REPORT-NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS: ENTRY, JURIS-
DICTION, OWNERSHIP AND REGULATION 5-6, 22 (1980); Coase, The Federal Communieatlons
Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 20-21, 27-28, 38-40 (1959).
153. Of course, in fulfilling its responsibilities, the press's freedom as well as that of the citi-
zens it serves must be supplemented in a positive fashion:
An ideally free press is free/or the achievement of those goals of press service which its
own instinct of workmanship and the requirements of the community combine to estab-
lish, and for these ends it must have command of all available technical resources,
financial strength, reasonable access to sources of information at home and abroad, and
the necessary staff and facilities for bringing its informatin and its judgments to the
national market.
W. HOCKING, supra note 23, at 195 (emphasis in original).
154. To protect the press is no longer automatically to protect the citizen or the commu-
nity. The freedom of the press can remain a right of those who publish only if it incorpo-
rates into itself the right of the citizen and the public interest.
The press... must be free for making its contribution to the maintenance and
development of a free society.
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2. Public interest. Given that speech under a social-responsibility
scheme is subject to regulation, it is the interest of the public that serves
as the standard for such regulation. 155 The right of speech is under-
stood to encompass two rights: that of the audience as well as that of
the speaker.'5 6 The relevance of the listener's right is implicit, social-
responsibility theorists contend, even under a libertarian theory. "In-
separable from the right of the press to be free has been the right of the
people to have a free press," wrote William E. Hocking.' 57 "But the
public interest has advanced beyond that point; it is now the right of
the people to have an adequatepress.' 158 And of the two rights, it is the
right of the public "which today tends to take precedence in impor-
tance."' 59 This public right is adverted to most commonly in terms of
the "public's right to know,"'160 which has been urged even by those
This implies that the press must also be accountable. It must be accountable to
society for meeting the public need and for maintaining the rights of citizens and the
almost forgotten rights of speakers who have no press. It must know that its faults and
errors have ceased to be private vagaries and have become public dangers. ... Free-
dom of the press for the coming period can only continue as an accountable freedom.
COMMISSION, supra note 109, at 18-19.
155. See id 8, 18, 127 app.
156. W. HocKiNo, supra note 23, at 169. This concept is not foreign to a libertarian interpre-
tation. Indeed, one can question whether allowing speakers to speak but preventing an audience
from hearing their words constitutes the exercise of a speech right. Implicit in the concept of
"public" forum is the right of listeners as well as speakers to be free from government regulation.
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969); Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.),
quoted with approvalin Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293 (1951); Cass, supra note 20, at 1287-
88; Kalven, The Concept a/fthe Public Forum Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. Rv. 1, 11-12.
Likewise, unwarranted intrusions on the listeners have been thought sufficient to restrict the rights
of speakers. See Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736-37 (1970); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77, 87-89 (1949); Black, He Cannot Choose But Hear: The Plight ofthe Captive Auditor, 53
CoLUM. L. REv. 960passkn (1953). Compare Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
546, 555-56 (1975) with Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298,302,304 (1974) (opinion
of Blackmun, J.). But see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971). At the very least, the
first amendment right of assembly can be viewed as the audience's corollary to the freedoms of
speech and press. Cf. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577 (1980) (right of
assembly a "catalyst" for other first amendment rights).
157. W. HoCKINo, supra note 23, at 169. Professor Hocking was a member of the Commis-
sion on Freedom of the Press, and the Commission relied heavily on his contributions. See J.
GERALD, THE SocIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PRESS 164 (1963).
158. W. HOCKaNG, supra note 23, at 169 (emphasis in original).
159. Id
160. See Peterson, supra note 26, at 73. See generally H. CRoss, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO
KNow (1953); C. WHALEN, JR., YouR RIGHT TO KNow (1973); Emerson, LegalFoundations ofthe
Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1; Goodale, Legal Pitalls in the Right to Know, 1976 WASH.
U.L.Q. 29; Hennings, Constitutional Law.- The People's Right to Know, 45 A.B.A.J. 667 (1959);
Horton, The Public's Rght to Know, 3 N.C. CENT. LJ. 123 (1972); Kutaer, Freedom of Informa-
tion: Due Process of the Right to Know?, 18 CATH. LAw. 50 (1972); Mardian, What Should the
People Know?, TRIAL Mar.-Apr. 1972, at 16; Parks, The Open Government Prnciple: Applying the
Bight to Know Under the Constitution, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1957); Philos, The Public's Right
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whose private interests are subordinated.' 61 Press owners' and practi-
tioners' advocacy of the public's right to know according to Professor
Jay Jensen
may in some cases be merely an attempt to safeguard their enjoy-
ment of press freedom as a personal right under the guise of a con-
cern for a public right. Still, their shift in emphasis from an
individual to a collective right, whether a public relations strategy or
not, is widespread and illustrates the continuing collectivization of
the meaning and status of freedom of the press as a right. 162
Keeping foremost the ideal of self-regulation,' 63 social-responsibil-
ity proponents pay homage to libertarian principles by recognizing
that, in general, protection of the right of the speaker or publisher suf-
fices to serve the public interest. 64 Indeed, these essentially individual-
istic sources of thought should not be unduly hampered. 65 To do so
to Know and the Public Interest-A Dilemma Revisited, 19 FED. B.J. 41 (1959); Rogers, The Right
to Know Government Business/rom the Viewpoint ofthe Government Official, 40 MARQ. L. REv. 83
(1956); Wiggins, The Role ofthe Press in Safe-Guarding the People'sR ight to Know Government
Business, 40 MARQ. L. REv. 74 (1956); Yankwich, Legal Implications of, and Barriers to, the Right
to Know, 40 MARQ. L. Rnv. 3 (1956); Note, The ConstiltutionalR('ght o Know, 4 HASTINOS CONST.
L.Q. 109 (1977); Note,Access to Government Information and the Classfcatlon Process-Is There a
Right to Know?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 814 (1971); Note, The Bight to Know in First AmendmentAnalyss, 57
TEX. L. REv. 505 (1979); Comment, National Security and the Public r Right to Know: A New Role
for the Courts Under the Freedom of Information Act, 123 U. PA. L. Rlv. 1438 (1975).
Kent Cooper of the Associated Press coined the phrase "the people's right to know" in 1945,
using it in talks and articles as a rationale for facilitating international communications. "The
Right to Know," N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1945, at 18 (editorial); see Peterson, Social Responsibility
Thirty Years after the Hutchins Commission 12-13 (unpublished manuscript in author's posses-
sion at the University of Illinois).
161. J. WIGGINS, FREEDOM OR SECRECYpassim (rev. ed. 1964); Society of Professional Jour-
nalists, Sigma Delta Chi, Code of Ethics, QUILL, Sept. 1980, at 29, refprinted in M. FRANKLIN,
supra note 17, at 716 app. C; see D. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 438-39 (1977); f Cronkite,
Introduction to C. WHALEN, JR., YOUR RioHT TO KNOW at x (1973) (freedom of the press is a
right of the American public); Sulzberger, The Newspaper-Its Making andMeaning, in 11 VITAL
SPEECHES 539, 541 (1945) (press freedom is people's freedom).
162. Jensen, supra note 59, at 81." Individuals cannot be faulted for adopting a collective per-
spective that pervades societal attitudes. To relate to their society, individuals' rhetoric may reflect
collectivism although their ideology remains individualistic. The dilemma thus posed, of course,
is whether an individualist, liberal orientation can be reinforced or even retained when its advo-
cates actually advocate a different philosophy, perhaps even unwittingly. The rhetoric may
reshape the philosophical orientation. Press owners and practitioners may come to see themselves
as having
.reality and meaning only in the collectivity of culture and in relation to other culturally
determined selves. In short, the "autonomous" self is being replaced by the "cultural"
self; and the effects of this displacement are visible not only in contemporary life and
thought in general, but in definition and status of freedom of the press in particular.
Id 78; see id 78-81. See note 108 supra.
163. See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
164. See CoMIssIo N, supra note 109, at 112; Peterson, supra note 26, at 74.
165. W. HOCKING, supra note 23, at 169 n.7; see COMMISSION, supra note 109, at 111-12 app.,
125 app.
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would ultimately disadvantage the public who would not have the ben-
efit of diverse ideas from which to choose its policies of self-
government.1 66
It is apparent in the social-responsibility context, however, that al-
though giving every individual the most opportunities to speak may
represent the optimum, 67 it is essential "not that everyone shall speak,
but that everything worth saying shall be said."' 68 In a phrase that can
well be the credo of the social-responsibility advocates, Alexander
Meiklejohn sliced to the core of the public-interest principle when he
noted that "the point of ultimate interest is not the words of the speak-
ers, but the minds of the hearers."' 169
The press is free to be accurate, 170 to convey all ideas deserving of
a public hearing, 171 and to educate the public. 172 Extrapolating from
these basic mandates, a social-responsibility proponent contemplates
public access to the media,173 and compulsory expression174-including
166. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 144, at 26-27. The checking function, which is crucial to the
libertarian principle of nonregulation, see notes 34-52 supra and accompanying text, is distinct
from the value of free expression in promoting self-government. See Blasi, supra note 20, at 554-
67.
167. Meiklejohn proposes that protection be absolute in the case of political speech. See A.
MEl..EJoHN, supra note 144, at 35-39; Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961
Sup. CT. REv. 245, 255. He qualifies that "absoluteness," however, with rules of etiquette, A.
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 144, at 22-24, and the condition that views expressed be "responsibly
entertained." Id at 27. Professors Kalven and Karst both point out that Meiklejohn's town-
meeting example, id at 22-25, oversimplifies the practical problems in implementing the philoso-
phy. See Kalven, supra note 156, at 26; Karst, supra note 20, at 40.
168. A. ME IIU.ToHN, supra note 144, at 25. Hocking notes that censorship is appropriate to
prevent "diseducation" from speech that is only of negative worth because it degrades and causes
"the slow unbalancing of emotion in the accepting mind, the disintegration of personality, the
decay of taste, the gradual confirmation in the individual case of the hypothesis put before him
that man is an animal-and nothing else." W. HOCKING, supra note 23, at 191-93.
169. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 144, at 25; CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 122
(1973) (quoting A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITicAL FREEDOM 26 (1948)); see Z. CHAFEE, JR., supra note
90, at 546; COMMISSION, supra note 109, at 23-24. But see Z. CHAFEE, JR., supra note 90, at 695-
96. The Supreme Court endorsed the principle as applied to the electronic media in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." Id at 390. One commentator has noted that the
sentence is pregnant with future possibilities. Powe, "Or of the fBroadcastj Press," 55 TEx. L.
Rv. 39, 46 (1976).
170. See COMMISSION, supra note 109, at 21-23, 120-21 app. Of course, the press is not ex-
pected to be infallible and inadvertent error is condoned in the name of encouraging speech. See
id 121-22 app.
171. See id 23-25, 28, 129 app.; W. HOCKING, supra note 23, at 98.
172. COMMISSION, supra note 109, at 26-28.
173. Id 23-24, 129 app.; Barron, Access to the Press-A New FirstAmendment Right, 80 HARV.
L. REv. 1641, 1654-56, 1658-60, 1666, 1678 (1967). The Commission regarded the media as "com-
mon carriers of public discussion," but was quick to qualify its choice of words by noting that it
did not mean to imply compulsory access for all applicants. COMMISSION, supra note 109, at 23 &
n.l. Although the Commission downplayed the governmental role, Barron was unambiguously
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disclosure of sources of information17 5 and identities of authors176-so
the public can more reliably judge the veracity of information it
receives.
3. Implementation of social-responsibilityprinciples. Commercial
speech is the paradigm of the implementation of the social-responsibil-
ity principle of speech regulated in the public interest. Regulation of
commercial speech antedates application of the public-interest princi-
ple. Indeed, initially regulation was condoned to protect the private
interests of business competitors. 177 It was argued that, without regula-
tion of false or deceptive claims, an unfavorable diversion of trade
would disadvantage the interests of scrupulous advertisers. 178  The
prospect of government regulation undoubtedly appealed to honest ad-
vertisers who would be free to direct their marketing resources to more
positive uses than correcting the misinformation disseminated by
competitors. 179
Regulation in furtherance of private interests is accepted most by
speakers whose interests are furthered.180 As libertarians might have
predicted, however, government sought to increase the scope of its reg-
ulation,' 8' which in turn increased the number of private interests ad-
frank in stating that government necessarily is the ultimate arbiter of access. Barron, supra at
1667-78.
174. COMMISSION, supra note 109, at 124 app.
175. Id 25.
176. W. HOCKING, supra note 23, at 187. Chafee agreed for the most part, but he had reserva-
tions concerning the practical aspects of implementation. Z. CHAFEE, JR., supra note 90, at 487-
88.
177. See FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 650, 652-53 (1931); 0. PEASE, THE RESPONSIBILI-
TIES OF AMERICAN ADVERTISING 90 (1958). The advertising trade press eventually expressed its
regret that the Federal Trade Commission, "begun as an aid to business, [has] now become an
enemy of business in having to interfere with the natural relations between business and the pub-
lic." 0. PEASE, supra, at 91.
178. See FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 72 (1934); FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co.,
258 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1922).
179. The motivations and rationales for advertising are set out in detail in Brown, Advertlsing
and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1167-83 & n.10
(1948).
180. See B. SCHWARTZ & H.W.R. WADE, LEGAL CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT-ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 33 (1972); 1 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COM-
MISSION NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, FINAL REPORT-NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS: ENTRY,
JURISDICTION, OWNERSHIP AND REGULATION 21-22 (1980). See generall, I Monopo, Problens in
RegulatedIndustries: Hearings Be/ore the Antitrust Subcomr. of the House Comm. on the Judii-
ary, 84th Cong.. 2d Sess. 61, 64 (1956) (statement of Marver H. Bernstein); M. EDELMAN, THE
SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 24, 56-58 (1964).
181. See note 29 supra and accompanying text. Justice Douglas, in his inimitable manner,
touched on this penchant of government to expand its authority when he posed the "camel's nose
in the tent" metaphor. The FCC's fairness doctrine, Douglas wrote, "puts the head of the camel
inside the tent and enables administration after administration to toy with TV or radio in order to
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versely affected.' 82 With the passage of the Wheeler-Lea Amendments
to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).Act, 183 the FTC was given the
authority to. regulate on behalf of consumers as well as commercial
speakers.'8 4 The power of the FTC to act in the public interest has
continued to grow.'85 The significancd, in constitutional terms, of this
serve its sordid or its benevolent ends." CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 154 (Doug-
las, J., concurring); see Z. CtArFE, JR., supra note 90, at 709-11. The fear is that where the
camel's nose goes, so goes the camel. For a thoughtful analysis of this phenomenon, see Bollinger,
Freedom of the Press and the Public .4ccess: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass
Media, 75 MICH. L. Rav. 1, 20-22, 31-32 (1976).
Professor Chafee, who served on the Commission for a Free and Responsible Press and who
contemplated affirmative governmental action to ensure freedom of expression, Z. CHAEE, JR.,
supra note 90, at 547, nonetheless warned that such action carries with it the potential for govern-
ment intervention into the communications process to an impermissible extent. See id 477, 694-
96.
182. See A. BicKa., THE MoRALrrY OF CONSENT 60 (1975).
183. Act of March 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. Ill, (amending 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1934))
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976)).
184. "ITihis amendment makes the consumer, who may be injured by an unfair trade practice,
of equal concern, before the law, with the merchant or manufacturer injured by the unfair meth-
ods of a dishonest competitor." H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1937); see Note, The
Consumer and Federal Regulation of/Advertising, 53 HARv. L. Rav. 828, 834-37 (1940). The
Wheeler-Lea Amendments were a legislative response to the decision in FTC v. Raladam Co., 283
U.S. 643 (1931), in which the Court found injury to consumers irrelevant absent initial proof of
injury to competitors. See id at 648-49, 653. Until recently, however, regulation on behalf of
competitors continued to receive substantial emphasis from the FTC. See Pitofsky, BeyondNader:
Consumer Protection and the Regulation of.dvertising, 90 HARV. L. REv. 661, 680 (1977).
It may have been more than coincidence that the social-responsibility theory was coming into
vogue, see note 108 supra, at a time of "burgeoning administrative activity by the federal govern-
ment in the 1930's." Williams, F/fry Years ofthe Law of the Federal4dministrative,4gencies-4nd
Beyond, 29 FED. BJ. 267, 268 (1970). Five of the "big seven" administrative agencies were estab-
lished in the 1930s. B. ScHwAxRTz & H.W.R. WADE, supra note 180, at 28. The standard often
used to "guide" this regulatory activity is the public interest. E.g., Communications Act of 1934,
ch. 652, tit. III, §§ 303, 307(a), 309(a), 310(b), 48 Stat. 1081 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307(a),
309(a), 310(b) (1976)). Professors Schwartz and Wade commented about the application of this
standard to the Federal Communications Commission: "In practice, Congress has given the Com-
mission what amounts to carte blanche. Telling the F.C.C. to act in the public interest is the
equivalent of telling it: 'Here is the regulatory problem; deal with it as you choose." B.
ScHwARTz & H.W.R. WADE, supra note 180, at 32. For further criticism of the public-interest
standard, see Coase, supra note 152, at 8-9. "This phrase, taken from public utility legislation,
lacks any definite meaning. It !means about as little as any phrase that the drafters of the Act
could have used and still comply with the constitutional requirement that there be some standard
to guide the administrative wisdom of the licensing authority."' Id 8 (quoting Caldwell, The
Standard of Public Interest, Convenience or Necessity as Used in the Radio Act of 1927, 1 Air L.
Rav. 295, 296 (1930)). See generally A. BicKE., THE LEAST DANGEROuS BRANCH 160-61 (1962).
Given the ambiguity of the standard, the question may fairly be raised whether the standard
does little more than thinly disguise governmental attempts to legislate expansion of its authority.
To point out that the standard gives the government flexibility in addressing problems, see.FCC v.
Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940), presumes the authority of government, al-
though the question of greater import may be the legitimacy of the authority.
185. See generally FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239-44 (1972); Maguuson-
Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183
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change in focus from private to public interests was addressed in 1976,
when the Supreme Court decided Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc. ,16 a case brought by "the
pubic"--the potential recipients of the prohibited speech.
"The public interest proved determinative in Virginia Pharmacy.
Indeed, the Court ignored the private interest of the speakers in com-
municating their commercial message. 18 7 Justice Blackmun, writing
for a nearly unanimous Court 88 and using as his touchstone the inter-
ests of the potential recipients, eloquently appraised the value of maxi-
mizing the flow of information. Noting the keen public interest in the
commercial information at issue, he asserted that its suppression af-
fected most seriously those in the worst straits: the poor, the sick, and
the elderly.18 9 Decrying the supposed advantages of a public kept in
ignorance, Blackmun extolled the ability of the people to "perceive
their own best interests if only they are well enough informed." 190
Blackmun made clear that the public's interest is not simply the aggre-
gate of the individual consumers' interests; he concluded that not only
individual consumers but
all of society may have a strong interest in the free flow of commer-
cial information. Even an individual advertisement, though entirely
(1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-46, 2301-2312 (1976)). But see Federal Trade Commission
Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, §§ 5, 11, 19-21, 94 Stat. 374 (1980).
186. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In Virginia Pharmacy a consumer group brought suit against the
Virginia Pharmacy Board challenging the constitutionality of a statute that prohibited pharma-
cists from advertising prescription drug prices. Some of the groundwork for the Virginia Phar-
macy holding was laid in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In the latter case,
a defamation plaintiff argued that the advertisement in which he was libeled should not raise first
amendment questions. Respondent's Brief at 30-31, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964). The plaintiff relied on precedent in which the Court had seemingly created a commer-
cial-speech exception to first amendment protection. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52,
54-55 (1942). But see Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 819-20 (1975); DeVore & Nelson, Com-
merical Speech and Paid Access to the Press, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 745, 754 (1975). See also Me-
tromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882, 2891-92 (1981) (opinion of White, J.).
Moreover, the plaintiff pointed out that the inclusion of editorial copy had not previously per-
suaded the Court to protect commercial speech and added that even the Times had classified the
advertisement at issue as commercial. Respondent's Brief at 31, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964). Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, brushed aside the plaintiffs argu-
ment, however, noting that the advertisement at issue involved the civil rights movement. 376
U.S. at 266. It therefore raised issues "of the highest public interest." Id Protection, accordingly,
was granted. Brennan went on to sever the roots of seditious libel, but for present purposes it is
significant that he crossed this initial hurdle by resort to the social-responsibility principle of pub-
lic interest.
187. The private interests in not communicating commercial messages were addressed, albeit
perfunctorily. See 425 U.S. at 768-69.
188. Only Justice Rehnquist dissented. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case.
189. 425 U.S. at 763.
190. Id at 770.
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"commercial," may be of general public interest .... Obviously,
not all commercial messages contain the same or even a very great
public interest element. There are few to which such an element,
however, could not be added.191
It is illuminating to note that the "purely economic" nature of the
advertisers' interests no longer disqualifies their speech from first
amendment protection.192 The Court did not explain why the consum-
ers' interests in the speech were keener than those of the advertisers, or
why the advertisers' economic motivations were apparently suspect,
and yet the equally economic motives of consumers provided reasons
for protecting the advertisers' speech. The reason can only be that lib-
ertarian principles were eschewed in favor of a social-responsibility
analysis. Justice Blackmun dispelled any doubt regarding this conclu-
sion by stating that although commercial speech is protected, "[s]ome
forms of commercial speech regulation are surely permissible."'193 Sig-
nificantly, among the types of regulation to which commerical speech
potentially is subject are prior restraint 94 and compulsory expres-
sion'95-hallmarks of social-responsibility theory. 96
Both prior restraint and compulsory expression have become tools
of the FTC used to prohibit false or misleading advertising 97 and to
prohibit even commercial speech that may well be true, but whose truth
has not been proven to the Commission's satisfaction.' 98 The Commis-
sion regulates and fine tunes the content of the commercial speech that
it approves by ordering affirmative disclosure' 99 and even corrective
advertising2 °-oall in the name of the public interest.
191. Id at 764.
192. Id at 762. Under the Court's analysis the economic rights of the advertisers. are
irrelevant.
193. Id at 770.
194. Id at 771-72 & n.24.
195. Id at 772 n.24.
196. See notes 133-36, 168 supra and accompanying text.
197. E.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965) (use of mock-up to show that
sandpaper could be softened with particular shaving cream); P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52
(4th Cir. 1950) (claim that one cigarette has less nicotine than other brands); De Forest's Training,
Inc. v. FTC, 134 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1943) (representation by television repair school that unlimited
opportunities would be present in growing industry).
An advertisement that may be literally correct, yet is open to misleading inference, is also
subject to censure. See, eg., Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1942) (claim for "relief"
from menstruation can be interpreted as "cure"). See generaly Developments in the La--Decep-
tive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1005, 1043-46 (1967).
198. See Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 62-64 (1972).
199. See, eg., LB. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967).
200. See, eg., Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 950 (1978); Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983
(1977). See generally Note, "Corrective Advertising" Orders of the Federal Trade Commission, 85
HAav. L. REV. 477 (1971).
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Although commercial-speech regulation represents the most per-
vasive implementation of the social-responsibility theory in first
amendment jurisprudence, 201 social-responsibility principles also
predominate in obscenity law,202 in the tort law of public disclosure of
private facts, 20 3 and particularly in the field of electronic-media regula-
tion.2 4 The facial attractiveness of using the "public interest" as a jus-
tification for limiting the prerogatives of the individual makes further
use of the theory in other areas of first amendment jurisprudence high-
ly likely.
II. A NEwS-GATHERING RIGHT CONSIDERED
After more than twenty-five years of discussion,20 5 the United
States Supreme Court recognized a first amendment news-gathering
201. This is not to say that an argument for the application of libertarian principles has not
been made. See, e.g, D. GILLMOR & J. BARRON, MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAW 641 (3d ed.
1979); 0. PEASE, supra note 177, at 150 (relating the argument as posed by advertisers of the 1920s
and 1930s).
202. See, eg., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1973); Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
203. See, eg., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 998 (1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(D), Comment h (1977). But Vf. Bezan-
son, Public Disclosures as News: Injunctive Relief and Newsworthiness in Privacy Actions Involving
the Press, 64 IOWA L. REv. 1061, 1073 (1979) (regulation by courts is limited in sense that "news-
worthiness" or public interest should "invariably result from the fact of publication").
204. See note 169 supra and accompanying text. Cf. Community Communications Co. v.
Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1376-77, 1376 n.5 (10th Cir. 1981) (overturning preliminary injunction
against city regulation of cable operations in interest of public).
205. Proposals for a constitutional news-gathering right date to at least 1952. See Note,Access
to Offcial Information" A Neglected Constitutional Right, 27 INn. L.J. 209, 213 (1952). See gener-
ally Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. Rev. 422, 464-65
(1980); Klein, Towards an Extension of the First Amendment: A P&ight of Acquisition, 20 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 114, 146-47 (1965); Lee, Privacy Intrusions While Gathering News.- An Accommodation of
Competing Interests, 64 IowA L. REv. 1243, 1283 (1979); Lewis, supra note 29, at 798, 804-06;
Note, The .Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 COLuM. L. REv. 838, 839 (1971); Note, The
Rights of Public and Press to Gather Information, 87 HARV. L. Rnv. 1505, 1506-10 (1974); Com-
ment, Broadcasters' News-Gathering Rights Under the First Amendment Garrett v. Estelle, 63
IowA L. Rv. 724, 745 (1978); Comment, The Right of the Press to Gather Information After
Branzburg and Pell, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 166, 166, 173 (1975). But see BeVier, supra note 43, at
493-94, 512-14; Gellhorn, he Right to Know: FirstAmendment Overbreadth?, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q.
25, 25-28.
See also Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REv. 229, 265-74
(1971) (subpoenas interfere with reporting in various ways); Zimmerman, supra note 89, at 644-47,
665 (needs of electronic media merit protection to facilitate news gathering); Note, Open Meeting
Statutes: The Press Fighisfor the '"Rght to Know," 75 HARV. L. REv. 1199, 1203 (1962) (despite
reasonable arguments for constitutional-access right, courts have not recognized it; thus statutory
alternative is needed).
For a comprehensive review of the proposed bases for a reporter's right to withhold informa-
tion from disclosure--which are usually expressed in news-gathering rhetoric, see Comment, The
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right in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.206 In Richmond a Vir-
ginia trial judge granted the defendant's motion and excluded the pub-
lic and the press from a criminal trial, without making any evidentiary
findings regarding prejudice or considering less drastic measures. 20 7
The Supreme Court overturned on first amendment grounds the ruling
of the trial judge.208 The Chief Justice, also writing for Justices Stevens
and White, relied heavily on common law traditions, noting that
"throughout its evolution, the trial has -been open to all who care to
observe. '20 9 The Chief Justice found this unbroken tradition rooted in
sound policy. Twice adverting to the "therapeutic value" of open jus-
tice,2 10 he recognized that public trials are essential to a "perception of
fairness" 21 1 and an "appearance of justice."212 These latter concerns
obviate resort to self-help remedies and assuage community sentiments
of retribution.213 The interrelationship between history and policy
gives rise to a constitutional presumption of openness that gains sub-
stance through the first amendment. 214 Because "explicit, guaranteed
rights to speak and to publish concerning what takes place at a trial
Fallacy of Farber Failure to Acknowledge the Constitutional Newsman's Privilege in Criminal
Cases, 70 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 299, 301-12 (1979). The argument for a reporter privilege
to maintain confidentiality has been made since at least 1848. Id 301-02. See also Blasi, supra, at
229 n.1 (quoting THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 69 (Yale Univ. Press 1964)).
206. 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980). Chief Justice Burger noted that the nomenclature is unimpor-
tant, and it can just as easily be called a "'right of access."' Id at 576 (Burger, C.J.) (quoting
Powell, J., in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 397 (1979)).
207. 448 U.S. at 560.
208. Only Justice Rehnquist dissented, mincing few words in remonstrating that his col-
leagues' interpretation of the Constitution threatened to undermine basic precepts of federalism.
Id. at 605-06 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Powell took no part in the decision.
209. Id at 564 (Burger, C.J.); see id at 565-69. Justice Brennan also emphasized the "legacy
of open justice." Id at 590 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Blackmun welcomed
the Court's reliance "upon legal history in determining the fundamental public character of the
criminal trial." Id at 601 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). See also Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 419-33 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part).
210. 448 U.S. at 569-70 (Burger, C.J.).
211. Id at 570.
212. Id at 572 (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)). Justice Stevens has
noted that the "mere existence of inflexible access barriers generates a concern that conditions
within the closed institution require especially close scrutiny." Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S.
1, 22 n.7 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
213. 448 U.S. at 570-73.
214. Id at 575. "From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid
today as in centuries past, we are bound to conclude that a presumption of openness inheres in the
very nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice." Id at 573. Burger referred to this
presumption numerous times. See id at 567, 569, 575-77, 580 n.17. "In guaranteeing freedoms
such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of
everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees." Id at 575. "The
right of access to places traditionally open to the public, as criminal trials have long been, may be
seen as assured by the amalgam of the First Amendment guarantees of speech and press .
Id at 577.
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would lose much meaning" if arbitrarily denied,215 "the right to attend
criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment." 216
The question that presents itself in the wake of this "watershed
case" 217 is the scope of the news-gathering right beyond the criminal-
trial context.218 The traditions and policies219 that produce a presump-
215. Id at 576-77 (emphasis added).
216. Id at 580 (emphasis added). Justice Stewart, author of the majority opinion in the pre-
trial courtroom-closure case, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), concurred in the
judgment in 'chmond and wrote separately to point out that in Ganneu the first amendment issue
has been squarely addressed only by Justice Powell, who stated that the first amendment gives "at
least a limited right of access." 448 U.S. at 599 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment). Justice
Blackmun concurred in the judgment as well, writing separately to note that he supported the
result on first amendment grounds only as a secondary position. Id at 604 (Blackmun, 3., concur-
ring in judgment). He believed that his dissenting opinion on sixth amendment grounds in Gan.
nett had been vindicated to the extent that the Court was now more receptive to his historical
interpretation of the public nature of trails, and that the confusion over the inferences to trails as
well as to pre-trial hearings in Gannett had been clarified. Id at 601-02.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in the judgment and availed himself
of the opportunity to explicate his structural model of the first amendment. See Id at 587 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in judgment). "The structural model links the First Amendment to that pro-
cess of communication necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus entails solicitude not only
for communication itself, but for the indispensable conditions of meaningful communication."
Id at 587-88. Thus, a valid first amendment claim can be made whenever the citizens' need for
information relevant to self-government is at issue. See id at 585-89. Brennan recognized the
exceedingly broad dimensions of the first amendments coverage under this analysis. Id at 588.
He noted that "almost insurmountable" protection was accorded outright communication between
speakers and listeners. Id at 587. When the antecedents to the actual communication were at
issue, rather than the communication itself, he proposed two principles to focus analysis: the "tra-
dition of public entry to particular proceedings or information" and whether access promotes
objectives of the particular government process. Id at 589. In short, the interests in obtaining the
information must be balanced against the opposing interests invaded. See id Brennan conducted
a lengthy examination of the "essentially unwavering rule" regarding public trials under English
and United States common law and the United States Constitution. Id at 589-93. He noted that
"the conduct of a trial is preeminently a matter of public interest," Id at 596, and concluded that
"[plopular attendance at trials. . . substantially furthers the particular public purposes of that
critical judicial proceeding." Id at 597. Because tradition and public interests militated strongly
against closure, Brennan concurred that the first amendment required that the trial be public. Id
at 598.
217. Id at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring).
218. The right most likely extends to civil trials as well. See Id at 580 n.17 (Burger, C.J.); Id
at 598-601 (Stewart, J., concurring injudgment). Judge Prentice Marshall of the District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois has suggested that the right covers not only attendance at trials,
but also inspection of court records. Address by Judge Marshall, University of Illinois Depart-
ment of Journalism (Feb. 20, 1981); see United States v. Carpentier, 526 F. Supp. 292, 294-95
(E.D.N.Y. 1981); Litton Systems, Inc. v. AT&T, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1903, 1903 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 2, 1981); People v. Peterson, No. 81-CF-397, slip op. at 1 (Cir. Ct., Champaign County, Ill.,
Apr.'23, 1981) (public has first amendment right to examine court file); c In re NBC, 635 F.2d
945, 951-52 (2d Cir. 1980) (common law right of inspection furthers interests articulated in Rlch-
mond). Anthony Lewis has suggested an expansive interpretation. See Lewis, A Right to be In-
formed, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1980, at A19. Of course, the holding can be limited to its facts, and
the first amendment interests may be subordinated even in criminal trials when an "overriding
interest [is] articulated in the findings." 448 U.S. at 581 (Burger, C.J.).
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tion of openness at a trial may be equally persuasive in other settings.
Just as a trial can be considered a public forum in which the right to
hear is as important as the right to speak,220 so too can the public na-
ture of other forums within government control provide grounds for a
guarantee of unrestricted access under the Richmond rationale.22 1
Moreover, even when arguments of tradition and policy are not as
compelling, the interests justifying denial of access may also be less
forceful.222 In this respect, the cases preceding Richmond offer more
insight into the probable scope of a news-gathering right than does
Richmond itself. We first examine the analytical foundations of a
news-gathering right in terms of social-responsibility and libertarian
principles. Then an alternative analytical framework is proposed
which accommodates a libertarian interpretation of private speech and
press rights and fulfills the public right to information within govern-
ment control.
A. Development of a News-Gathering Right.
The Supreme Court has made two choices that dominate the anal-
ysis of the news-gathering right. First, the Court has defined the rights
of the press by reference to the rights of the public. 223 Second, the
Court has concentrated its prior-restraint analysis on the use224 or
availability225 of a medium. Declining to employ prior-restraint no-
menclature when addressing questions of obtaining information,2 6 the
Court has distinguished the gathering of information from its publica-
219. Recognition of custom along with its underlying policy can be interpreted as giving con-
stitutional dimension to common law access rights. See, eg., In re NBC, 635 F.2d 945, 949-52 (2d
Cir. 1980) (ABSCAM tapes case, citing Richmond as consistent with common-law right of access
to judicial records).
220. See note 156 supra. See Brief for Amid Curiae in Support of Jurisdictional Statement,
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, at 21, 26, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
221. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.) (the traditional
openness of streets and parks); Kalven, supra note 156, at 13-15, 32. See also Cass, supra note 20,
at 1287, 1318-37 (indicating various policy reasons central to the analysis of public forum cases).
222. See, eg., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 36-38 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 864-70'(1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
223. See notes 231-34 infra and accompanying text.
224. See, ag., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558 (1976); Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Near v. Minnesota ex rel Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
225. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Shuttlesworth v.
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303
U.S. 444 (1938).
226. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 393 n.25 (1979); id at 399 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
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tion. Presumably, gathering is considered sufficiently prior to publica-
tion to be subject to restraint.
The press first urged the Court to fashion protection for news gath-
ering in Branzburg v. Hayes.227 To require a reporter to testify before a
grand jury, it was argued, would deter potential news sources from dis-
closing information to the press, thereby inhibiting the flow of informa-
tion to the public. 228 Branzburg typifies the situation in which news
gathering is at issue only indirectly.22 9 The Court declared the poten-
tial deleterious effects on news gathering to be "speculative" and held
that reporters must testify regardless of the "incidental burdening" that
may result.2 30 The Branzburg rationale is summarized in the Court's
repeated assertion that the right of the press is no greater than that of
the public.23' For example, Branzburg author Justice White repeatedly
addressed the duty of all citizens to testify before a grand jury.232 He
appeared to question not only whether the proposed burden on the first
amendment interests of reporters was sufficiently certain, but also
whether it was inordinately distinct from the burden imposed on any-
one compelled to testify. 2 33 White stated his rationale in the form of a
conclusion that was quoted and relied on heavily by the authors of the
subsequent prison-access cases: "It has generally been held that the
First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right
of special access to information not available to the public gener-
ally. . . .Newsmen have no constitutional right of access to the scenes
of crime or disaster when the general public is excluded .... 234
Analysis of the private-press right of nondisclosure in terms of a
correlative public right is perhaps understandable given the "long-
227. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
228. Id at 679-80.
229. See, eg., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (primarily a fourth amendment
case in which the issue concerned the constitutionality of issuing a search warrant for mere evi-
dence against a nonsuspect third party); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. AT&T, 593
F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979) (subpoenas for journalists' toll-call
records).
230. 408 U.S. at 682, 694; see id at 690-95.
231. See, e.g, Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9, 11 (1978) (Burger, C.J.); Saxbe v. Wash-
ington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834-35 (1974);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684-85 (1972).
232. See 408 U.S. at 682, 685-86, 688, 690-91, 697, 702.
233. See id at 686-92.
234. Id at 684-85, quotedin Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) (Burger, C.J.); see
PeU v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833-34 (1974). The authors of Branzburg and the prison-access
cases also found persuasive Chief Justice Warren's observation in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1
(1965) that the "right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather
information." Id at"17, quotedin Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 12 (1978) (Burger, C.J.);
see Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 n.9 (1974); 408 U.S. at 684.
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standing principle that 'the public... has a right to every man's evi-
dence.' "235 But deciding the question of the press's news-gathering
right in terms of the public's right leaves the question begging an an-
swer;236 one unknown is defined in terms of another.237 More signifi-
cantly, by diverting analysis from the right of the party before the
Court to the right of the public, one takes a long step toward imple-
mentation of social-responsibility principles.
The first justification for resort to the "no greater than" approach
seems to involve the fear of bestowing extraordinary first amendment
privileges on the press as an institution. One must define the "press" in
order to determine who it is that merits this greater or different right.238
The Court alluded to this concern in Branzburg when Justice White
wrote that the guarantee of press freedom is conferred not only on the
metropolitan publisher, but also on the "lonely pamphleteer who uses
carbon paper or a mimeograph."2 39 Perhaps the private interest of any
speaker or publisher is sufficient to mandate recognition of a- news-
gathering right. The Court avoided this much more explosive question
and at the same time created justifications for the result it chose by
asking the question in terms of a public right.
The second problem ancillary to the Court's recognition of a news-
gathering right is unavoidable regardless of whether the right is defined
in public or private terms. When denying recognition of a press right,
the Court has alluded to the impracticality of the opposite result.240
235. 408 U.S. at 688 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
Courts inevitably make no reference to a subsequent passage in which Wigiiore admonishes soci-
ety to "make the duty as little onerous aspossible." I (emphasis in original). The duty to appear
before a grand jury as a consequence of performing a constitutionally protected function takes on
the character of subsequent punishment, making the duty rather onerous indeed. See BeVier,
supra note 43, at 495 n.59.
236. See Lee, supra note 205, at 1250-53. As Judge Hufstedler noted in KQED, Inc. v.
Houchins, 546 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 438 US. 1 (1978), the statement that the right of the
press is coextensive with the public's right is not "helpful in absence of any description of what the
public's right is or how the right is to be vindicated"" Id at 295 (Hufstedler, J., concurring).
237. Note, The Rights of Public andPress to Gather Information, 87 HARv. L. Rlv. 1505, 1507
(1974).
238. Compare First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 801 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
with Bezanson, supra note I, at 781-85.
239. 408 U.S. at 704. Branzburg notwithstanding, the Court has never directly addressed the
necessity, in constitutional terms or otherwise, of distinguishing between press and public. First
Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring); see State ex rel. Dayton
Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457, 501, 351 N.E.2d 127, 153 (1976) (Celebrezze, J.,
dissenting); cf. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133 n.16 (1979) (application of New York
Times standard in libel suits to private-individual defendants rather than to media defendants has
never been decided by the .Court). See generally Blanchard, supra note 1, at 232-34.
240. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1978) (Burger, C.J.); Saxbe v. Washing-
ton Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 871 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting); 408 U.S. at 702-04 & n.39.
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The Court has indicated that it is unwilling to become involved in case-
by-case analyses of the scope of the right.24' The broad command of
the first amendment affords the courts no guidelines in access cases.2 42
The Court's assumption is that the legislature or the executive is the
better body to make and implement such decisions.2 43 Absent statutory
authority, the Court is reluctant to fashion ad hoc standards.244
We can look with some sympathy on the Court's desire to avoid
the intractable questions that the recognition of a private news-gather-
ing right would entail. By distinguishing news gathering from news
publishing the Court has been and will continue to be able to avoid the
questions attached to both the public and private rights. Moreover, it is
unlikely to confront the issue until convinced of the necessity of such a
right. In Branzburg, for example, the Court questioned whether any
potential burden on news gathering is of such a magnitude to merit a
press privilege not to testify. The Court was skeptical that all confiden-
tial sources would "dry up." In Pell v, Procunier245 and Saxbe v. Wash-
ington Post Co. ,246 the first prison-access cases, the Court disagreed
with the press's contention that face-to-face interviews with specifically
designated inmates is an appreciably superior and more effective
method of gathering news. The Court detailed alternative means of
communication with inmates, including mailed correspondence, ran-
dom interviews while touring, and contacts with inmates recently re-
leased.2 47 Likewise, in the most recent prison-access case, Houchins v.
KQED, InC. ,248 the denial to the press of physical access was justified
241. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978) (Burger, C.J.); 408 U.S. at 702 n.39.
But see 438 U.S. at 18 (Stewart, J., concurring).
242. See BeVier, supra note 43, at 506-12.
243. See 438 U.S. at 12 (Burger, C.J.); id at 34-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting); BeVier, supra note
43, at 513-14.
244. See generally Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J.
399 (1978).
The central dispute in constitutional theory has gone under different names at dif-
ferent times, but today's terminology seems as helpful as any. Today we are likely to call
the contending sides "interpretivism" and "noninterpretivism"-the former indicating
that judges deciding constitutional issues should confine themselves to enforcing values
or norms that are stated or very clearly implicit in the written Constitution, the latter
indicating the contrary view that courts should go beyond that set of references and
enforce values or norms that cannot be discovered within the four corners of the docu-
ment. . . . What distinguishes interpretivism from its opposite is its insistence that the
work of the political branches is to be invalidated only in accord with an inference whose
starting point, whose underlying premise, is fairly discoverable in the Constitution.
Id at 399-400.
245. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
246. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
247. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 847-48; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 830.
248. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
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by the proposition that the press can learn of jail conditions in various
other ways, "albeit not as conveniently as [it] might prefer. '249
Reliance on alternative means of exercising rights does not com-
port with standard libertarian interpretation, 250 which first questions
the justification for state infringement on individual liberties2 51 and
then focuses on the availability of alternative means for the state to
accomplish its ends without impinging private interests.252 The bur-
den, in a libertarian analysis, clearly is on the state to demonstrate why
private interests cannot be accommodated. If the state cannot meet this
burden, it must defer to the individual's choice of forum 253 and con-
tent,254 even if the individual is asserting a news-gathering right.255 But
the burden seems to be on the individual in the news-gathering cases;
the person seeking access must overcome a presumption favoring the
government's determination of the public right of access and of the
means by which that right is best served. By orienting the analysis in
terms of the public right rather than the private right, the Court has
eschewed resort to a body of law founded on libertarian principles and
has given itself great latitude to substitute the judgment of the state for
that of the individual in deciding the extent to which rights exist. The
249. Id at 15.
250. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975); Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939); f Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 733-36 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (amount of deference to be accorded first amendment rights is demonstrated by re-
peated holdings of unconstitutionality in cases in which the restriction is rationally related to the
exercise of the right). But see Garcia v. Gray, 507 F.2d 539, 543 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 971 (1975); Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns v. United States Postal Serv., 448 F. Supp.
159, 163 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 586 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1978), on remand, 490 F. Supp. 157 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 2676 (1981).
251. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 101 S. Ct. 2176,2183 (1981) (quoting Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 508-11 (1969); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960). See note 82 supra.
252. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 101 S. Ct. 2176, 2183-84 (1981) (quoting Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980)); Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-64 (1976). Inquiry into the availability of alternative means of
communication is undertaken if the regulation concerns the time, place, or manner of expression
and only if the government carries its burden regarding the first two inquiries. See Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 119-21 (1972); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 81-82, 87-89 (1949);
cf. Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93-94, 97 (1977) (consideration of
.nonexistence of alternative methods of communication as well as identification of asserted state
interest in regulation and of alternative means of furthering that interest in a commercial-speech
case).
253. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975); Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
254. See National Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43-44 (1977); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-26 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418
(1971). See note 82supra.
255. The breadth of such a news-gathering right and the problems associated with such an
interpretation, both of which may explain why the Court is seeking an alternative approach, are
discussed at notes 305-06 infra and accompanying text.
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court reconciled this adoption of a social-responsibility framework for
interpreting a news-gathering right with the usual libertarian analysis
by distinguishing between prior restraint of gathering and prior re-
straint of publication. Notwithstanding that the news-gathering efforts
of the press may be impinged to some degree in each case, the Court
has thought it significant that the press remains free to publish
whatever information it can acquire. Thus, the Court has constructed a
dichotomy between gathering and publication, the viability of which is
crucial to the principled application of disparate theories to the news-
dissemination process.
Before Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,256 therefore, the Court main-
tained that news gathering is a distinct component of news dissemina-
tion, and it based its consistent refusal to recognize a first amendment
right to gather news on three premises: press rights are concomitant
with public rights; the lack of concrete standards to guide judicial im-
plementation of a news-gathering right requires deference to other
branches; and the news-gathering method preferred by the press may
be unnecessary in light of alternatives. Of these, only the third was
relevant in Gannett.
In Gannett a reporter had been denied access to a pretrial suppres-
sion hearing. The attorney for the two murder defendants had made
the motion to close the hearing and neither the prosecutor nor the re-
porter present had objected. The following day, however, the reporter
requested that she be allowed to cover the hearing and that she be
given access to the transcript. The trial judge concluded that opening
the suppression hearing would create a "reasonable probability of
prejudice" to the defendants, and refused to reopen the hearing.25 7 He
declined to release the transcript immediately. The United States
Supreme Court upheld the decision of the New York Court of Ap-
peals25 8 that the trial judge's ruling was correct.
The press sought no special privilege in Gannett. The right of ac-
cess under the first amendment was posited as belonging to the public
as well as the press. There was, therefore, no problem of defining press.
Furthermore, there was no other branch to which the Court could defer
for a more principled resolution; no other branch would be better able
to fashion and implement a right of access. In short, the question was
presented to the body best equipped to address and resolve the issue.
256. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
257. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 55 App. Div. 107, 110 (1976), rev'd, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 401
N.Y.S.2d 756, 372 N.E.2d 544 (1977), at'd, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
258. 43 N.Y.2d 370, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756, 372 N.E.2d 544 (1977), af'd, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
[Vol. 1982:1
NEWS-GATHERING/PUBLICATION
The only remaining justification for rejecting a first amendment
right of access was a holding that the information need not be made
available in the manner preferred by the press-attendance at the hear-
ing. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, stated that the Court
need not reach the question whether there is a first amendment right of
access because the trial judge had assumed the existence of such a right
and had given it appropriate consideration. 259 It is significant, though,
that the intermediate New York court had reversed the judgment of the
lower court because the trial judge had demonstrated no deference to a
constitutional interest in access. 260
Stewart pointed out in a footnote that there had been no attempt to
prevent publication of information in the possession of the press.261 He
thus limited the question to denial of access and distinguished prior
restraint of publication. The Court's unanimous disaffection with
"gagging" the press evinced in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart262
was, therefore, of no assistance to the press in Gannett. In the pretrial
context, the Court applied a less stringent standard of justification for
restraint of a first amendment news-gathering right. Instead of requir-
ing a showing of grave and imminent danger to the fair administration
of justice, the court required, at most, a showing of a reasonable
probability of prejudice.263 Furthermore, in Nebraska Press the Court
focused on the restraint and forced the state to prove the absence of less
restrictive alternatives, but in Gannett the Court focused on the news
gathering and forced the press to establish the absence of alternative
news-gathering methods. A transcript of the suppression hearing had
been made available to the press once the potential for prejudice had
been eliminated. Thus, there was a "full opportunity" to inform the
public264 and little reason to accommodate the preferences of the press.
259. 443 U.S. at 392.
260. The appellate court noted that the only finding the trial judge had made before conclud-
ing that there was a "reasonable probability of prejudice" was that one of the defendants was a
juvenile. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 55 App. Div. 107, 110 (1976), rev'd, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 401
N.Y.S.2d 756, 372 N.E.2d 544 (1977), aji'd, 443 U.S. 368 (1979). Nonetheless, Justice. Stewart
adopted the trial judge's approach and conclusion.
261. 443 U.S. at 393 n.25.
262. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
263. See 443 U.S. at 393. The effect, if any, that the Richmond holding will have in revising
this standard is uncertain. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 598 (1980)
(Stewart, J., concurring). Indeed, the Richmond standard even as applied to trials is unclear. See
I PRACTIsiNG LAW INSTITUTE, COMMUNICATIONs LAW 1980, at 392-98 (1980).
264. 443 U.S. at 393. But see note 269 infra.
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B. Implications of the Gathering/Publication Dichotomy.
It can be said that there was an assumption in the news-gathering
cases as significant as any assumption yet articulated: that the magni-
tude of the competing societal interests in every case26 5-and most
markedly in Gannett-justified nonrecognition of a news-gathering
right. Although conceding the existence of countervailing interests, the
Court arguably has improperly conducted its balancing by failing to
account for societal interests favoring the press's preferred method of
news gathering.
But a more careful analysis of the Court's approach reveals its true
critical flaw. The Court lacks a cogent philosophy concerning news
gathering and, therefore, tends to analyze news-gathering cases with its
focus on publication. The Court's justifications for allowing impinge-
ment on news gathering are irrelevant to the actual news gathering at
issue and in fact stem from the perceived negative effects of allowing
publication. For example, the fear in the prison-access cases was that
media coverage would give undue prominence to particular inmates,
making them "big wheels," and creating disciplinary problems.266 Al-
though the Court has claimed it is distinguishing between gathering
and dissemination, 267 its foremost concern is with publication. The
Court's claimed distinction between gathering and publication allows it
to permit prior restraints-in the traditional sense--on news dissemina-
tion. Particularly in Gannett, the Court's concern was with a "reason-
able probability of prejudice" that only publication could have
engendered.268 No governmental interest was ever asserted as a justifi-
cation for limiting news gathering. Indeed, it is questionable whether
any governmental interest exists that justifies restrictions on the mere
gathering of news.
265. See Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 866-68 & n.10 (1974) (Powell, J., dis-
senting). But see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 583 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (absence of legitimate interests opposed to access in KQED); Lee, supra note 205, at
1250-51.
266. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 866-68 & n.10 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
267. As Professor Bezanson observed, the act of publication
is inseparable from the means of obtaining the information in the first instance. To
conclude, as do many of the Supreme Court's prior restraint cases, that once obtained
any information may be published, but that the custodian may be controlled so as to
prevent disclosure, is to rest the system of legal protection not only on imperfectly logical
but also on impractical, unrealistic, and unresponsive assumptions. In the end, the same
issues must be faced, the same analytical framework must be applied, and the same
balanced judgment must be reached ....
Bezanson, supra note 203, at 1109 (footnote omitted). See Allen v. Combined Communications
Corp., 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2417,2419 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 22, 1981). See also Goodale, supra
note 160, at 34; Lewis, supra note 29, at 802.
268. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 376 (1979).
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A hypothetical situation further demonstrates the flaw in the
Court's analysis. To obtain access to the pretrial hearing, the Gannett
reporter need only have promised not to publish information gathered
at the hearing until the information was no longer prejudicial.2 69 If the
reporter had agreed not to report on the proceedings until, for example,
jurors were empaneled and sequestered, then the jurors would not have
been exposed to any evidence ruled inadmissible at the pretrial hear-
ing. They would have retained whatever impartiality they had pos-
sessed, not because the reporter had not gathered the news but because
she had not published the news. Thus, the defendant's rights are not
affected, but the reporter's "right" is subject to judicial oversight. Ac-
curately defining the fear of the trial judge reveals that the supposed
dichotomy between gathering and publication is a pretext for preclud-
ing or conditioning publication.
The power to establish conditions270 and limitations on access is
tantamount to the power to dictate the content of the news. The
"news" that government officials reveal is the news that the reporters
269. See generally FED. R. CRIm. P. 43.1(c) (Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments
1981) (allowing court to impose limitations on access and disclosure).
Given the choice, any reporter would prefer to witness a hearing and write a story for delayed
publication rather than struggle through a transcript long after the fact. Not only is reading a
transcript tedious, but it is impossible to glean from the transcript the nuances of speech, the
ineptitude of attorneys and judges, or the "deal" that was consummated but stricken from the
record. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 597 n.22 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Oxnard Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 83, 95-96 (Cal. App. 1968)
(vacated as moot after change of venue granted). Indeed, reporters who take their duties seriously
may consider it incumbent on themselves to obtain access to such proceedings despite the price.
The trial court in Federated Publications v. Swedberg, 633 P.2d 74 (1981), took an approach
similar to the one hypothesized in the text. The judge imposed as a condition to media attendance
at a pretrial hearing the signing of an agreement to abide by bench-bar-press guidelines. The
Washington Supreme Court upheld this device, noting that the court order "did not involve a
prior restraint upon the exercise of free speech." Id at 77. Elsewhere the court said, "Inasmuch as
the court had the authority. . . to exclude all of the public, it had also the included power to
impose reasonable conditions upon attendance." Id at 78. The transparent intent of the court,
however, was to impose conditions on publication, not attendance.
270. See Wiseman v. Massachusetts, 398 U.S. 960, 963 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass. 251, 253-54, 249 N.E.2d 610, 612-13,
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1969); Federated Publications v. Swedberg, 633 P.2d 74, 78 (1981);
Cohen, Reconciling MediaAccess with Confidentialityfor the Individual in Juvenile Court, 20 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 405, 421-23 (1980); Zimmerman, supra note 89, at 701-03; Note,Access to Official
Information 4 Neglected Constitutional Right, 27 IND. L.J. 209, 209-10 (1952). See also CBS v.
FCC, 101 S. Ct. 2813, 2829 (1981); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 511 (1980). "A licensed
broadcaster is 'granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the public
domain; when he accepts that franchise it is burdened by enforceable obligations."' 101 S. Ct. at
2829 (quoting United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966)).
Parallels can be drawn to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, which limits the condi-
tions government may place on the exercise of a privilege. See, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 510 & n.30, 710 n.57 (1978).
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report.271 Of course, "the Press is free to try to uncover, and if it suc-
ceeds it is free-to publish 272 the information that the government at-
tempts to conceal. But, as the same commentator noted, the success of
the press in uncovering information from the government is "rare, hap-
hazard [and] fortuitous. '273 Numerous "public information special-
ists"274 throughout the government who manage, and arguably filter,
information determine the information that the press and public re-
ceive.275 The facts that such publicists prefer not to be published are,
of course, likely to be withheld. By controlling news gathering the gov-
ernment can effectively both proscribe and prescribe news dissemina-
271. See T. CROUSE, THE BoYs ON THE Bus 209 (1972) (during the Nixon years the White
House became a "massive public relations operation, exercising more and more control over the
distribution of the news"); C. PETERS, How WASHINGTON REALLY WoRKs 22 (1980) (quoting
Carter administration speechwriter James Fallows):
Within the White House, weekly summaries of the President's schedule were pre-
pared; for each day, they listed what the likely "news event" would be. Under normal
circumstances, that prediction almost always came true; if the President was making an
announcement about the U.S. Forest Service, the Forest Service would get one day's
news-and would not be in the news again until another announcement was planned.
Professor Van Aistyne has noted that influential and newsworthy public officials need "simply rely
on the public-spiritedness and competitive avarice of the private press to reach the public. It does
not involve governmentally owned presses or broadcast facilities dedicated to the espousal of an
official line, but it simply counts upon the regular press for its ready dissemination." Van Alstyne,
The First.4mendment and the Suppression of Warmongering Propaganda in the United States: Com-
ments and Footnotes, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 530, 535-36 (1966).
272. Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold- The Case ofthe Pentagon Papers,
120 U. PA. L. REv. 271, 278 (1971).
273. Id
274. The Civil Service terms for public-relations positions include "public information spe-
cialist" and "public information officer." D. WIsE, supra note 83, at 206. The euphemism is
necessitated in part by a stautory restriction on publicity experts. Id at 206-07; see 5 U.S.C.
§ 3107 (1976).
275. See 123 CONG. REc. 24,848-51 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Scott); C. PETERS, How WASH-
INOTON REALLY WoRKs 18 (1980); C. STEINIBERO, THE INFORMATION ESTABLISHMENT-OUR
GOvERNMENT AND THE MEDIA 4, 53-54, 91 (1980); D. WIsE, supra note 83, at 206-07, 209-10;
Lewis, supra note 29, at 797. See also W. LIPPMAN, PUBLIC OPINION 217-18 (1965):
The enormous discretion as to what facts and what impressions shall be reported is
steadily convincing every organized group of people that whether it wishes to secure
publicity or to avoid it, the exercise of discretion cannot be left to the reporter. It is safer
to hire a press agent who stands between the group and the newspapers. Having hired
him, the temptation to exploit his strategic position is very great....
... mhe picture which the publicity man makes for the reporter is the one he
wishes the public to see. He is censor and propagandist, responsible only to his employ-
ers, and to the whole truth responsible only as it accords with the employer's conception
of his own interests.
The danger of providing selective access to information, as Hocking observed, "is the ease of
falsifying without lying, as by the omission of relevant facts. There is no more effective type of le
than a skilfully biased selection of truth." W. HOCKING, supra note 23, at 115-16. Another com-
mentator noted, "It is a truism that, if a governing structure based upon widespread genuine
citizen opinions is to survive as a viable democracy, it must place legal restraints on the govern-
ment's ability to manipulate the formulation and expression of that opinion." Ziegler, Government
Speech and the Constitution? The Limits of Offlcial Parisanshp, 21 B.C.L. REv. 578, 580 (1980).
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tion. Because news gathering by the press is- a continuous process,
government officials can use access privileges as a lever to influence the
manner of presentation of facts that have been obtained. Pressures can
be exerted on those desirous of continuing access to be "objective 276 or
even biased in favor of government.277
Any role for government either in limiting or in ordaining the con-
tent of a publication is antithetical to libertarian precepts.278 Govern-
ment's role in regulating the gathering of information can be justified
under social-responsibility theory,279 however, because government is
presumed to act in the public interest and is the ultimate arbiter of the
public's right to be informed.280 Arguably, the Supreme Court's di-
chotomy between gathering and publication can be interpreted as an
attempt to accommodate both theories by applying the principles of
each to separate aspects of the news dissemination process.
But if the entity that controls gathering effectively controls publi-
cation, the dichotomy collapses, the accommodation skews in favor of
social-responsibility principles, and government obtains a distinct ad-
vantage in the contest between government and the press.28' By assert-
ing that publication is not at issue, the Court is able to proceed with a
mechanistic application of a "no greater than" formula282 that allows it
to avoid deciding whether publication may be prevented, or content
276. In this context objectiv!ty means a bland balance that obscures more than it reveals. See
notes 46-47 supra.
277. See notes 88-90 supra and accompanying text. For example, Newsday's White House
correspondent was repeatedly snubbed in his requests for information and access privileges during
the Nixon Administration's tenure after Newsday ran a six-part series and editorial critical of
Nixon's closest friend, Bebe Rebozo. D. WISE, supra note 83, at 218-22. Timothy Crouse, refer-
ring to this same incident, described the tactic as a "freeze-out." T. CROUSE, The Boys ON THE
Bus 233-35 (1972).
278. See notes 77-86, 99-107 supra and accompanying text.
279. Social-responsibility theory can easily justify a broad exception to the doctrine against
prior restraint that would allow publication to be precluded whenever government conceivably
could have prevented access to information. See notes 282 & 292 infra. Prior restraint can pro-
mote the public interest in a given case, see note 84 supra, and thus is integral to implementation
of social-responsibility theory. See notes 193-94, 239-42 supra and accompanying text. Likewise,
dictating the content of speech is not alien to a social-responsibility scheme. See notes 195-96,
199-200 supra and accompanying text.
280. See notes 121-54 supra and accompanying text.
281. See notes 1-3 supra and accompanying text.
282. The Court's analysis produces the same results as a test proposed by Justice Harlan.
Significantly, Harlan was dissenting from the Court's refusal to enjoin a publication when he
proposed the two-part test: (1) is the subject matter within the Executive's foreign-relations
power to classify, and (2) did the appropriate official classify the material? New York Times Co.
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 757 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1368 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975). Deference was due the
government-not the press-in determining whether the need was sufficiently great to classify the
material.
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dictated, by selective access to information. 283 In circumventing this
difficult question the Court nonetheless answers it.
Deference to government regulation of news gathering may have
far-reaching ramifications.2 4 For example, the media are forced to as-
sume the status assigned to them in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia285 of "surrogates for the public"286 who plead with government to
open its doors and reveal its records. Implicit in the concept of a surro-
Under Harlan's framework, if the authority to classify is not limited to the Executive, see,
ag., Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (denial of access to pretrial judicial proceed-
ing, and implicitly to transcript, upheld); Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589
(1978) (congressional restriction of common-law right of public access to Watergate tapes upheld),
and if the constitutional authority may be construed in textual references other than the foreign-
relations power, e.g., U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 18 (commerce and necessary and proper
clauses); id art. III, §§ 1-2 (the judicial power) (by implication); id amend. XiV, § 5 (enforcement
clause), then government officials have wholesale power to classify or to deny access. Indeed, this
model seems to govern all the results in the news-gathering cases, even Richmond, because the
Court can be interpreted as holding that the authority to deny access to trials exists but was
abused. The holdings in the news-gathering cases evince the same concern for judicial deference
to the discretion of other branches.
Of course, one as sensitive to first amendment values as Harlan, see G. GUNTHER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 1252 (9th ed. 1975), might have construed the requisite governmental authority very
narrowly. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (nullified in part by U.S. CoNsT. amend.
XXVI):
Although Congress' expression of the view that it does have power to alter state suffrage
qualifications [under the fourteenth amendment] is entitled to the most respectful consid-
eration by the judiciary, coming as it does from a coordinate branch of government, this
cannot displace the duty of this Court to make an independent determination whether
Congress has exceeded its powers.
400 U.S. at 204 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted).
Such sensitivity does not overcome the objection that by exercising the power to impede
gathering, even when the power is delegated in accordance with a strict interpretation, the govern-
ment is in fact impeding publication in direct contravention of the first amendment. The imposi-
tion on publication seems not to have been determinative in Harlan's dissent in New York Times.
283. As Justice Powell has observed, "[This analysis] obviates any need to enter the thicket of
a particular factual context in order to determine the effect on First Amendment values of a non-
discriminatory restraint on press access to information." Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S.
843, 875 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
284. If gathering is recognized as the determinative component of the dissemination process,
then government may be able to prevent publication of information already in the press's posses-
sion if the government had authority to prevent its release initially. See Snepp v. United States,
444 U.S. 507 (1980) (government authority upheld to bind former employee to contract signed at
beginning of employment prohibiting release of any information without prior review by agency);
ef. Federated Publications v Swedberg, 633 P.2d 74, 77-78 (1981) (court that has authority to
exclude all of public, including press, may allow press attendance on the condition that the press
abide by bar-bench-press guidelines).
285. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
286. 448 U.S. at 573 (Burger, C.J.); see Brief of Appellee at 49-50, 54, 106-07, Chandler v.
Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981). See generally Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 32-34 (1978)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863-64 (1974) (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Chief Justice Burger declined to use the proposed role of the press as surrogate as the
basis for an affirmative statutory duty to publish certain material. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 251 (1974).
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gate or proxy is that the press not only has a "right" to disseminate the
information that government releases, but that it has no right not to
disseminate such information.2 87 Should the press refuse to dissemi-
nate information that government has determined the public should
know, the press renounces its surrogate function and discredits its claim
to the information. Should the press assert a news-gathering right on
behalf of the public's right to know it would be accountable to the pub-
lic-and ultimately to government-in accordance with social-respon-
sibility principles. 288
The Court's present analysis of the news-gathering right subverts
the foundations of the right to publish. Under this analysis libertarian
principles cannot justify access to information because they apply only
to publication and it is fatally inconsistent to invoke social responsibil-
ity principles to obtain information on behalf of the public but then
contend that the press's only obligation concerning publication is to its
private interests. 28 9 The press is confronted with a no-win situation if it
must assert a right to gather news to exercise its right to publish; the
gathering right should not be analyzed in isolation from the right to
publish.
Garrett v. Estelle290 illustrates the inseparability of gathering and
publication and the extent to which the state can substitute its judgment
of appropriate content. By framing the issue in terms of news gather-
ing the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit substituted for analysis
the conclusion that a television cameraman has no greater right than
the public to film an execution.291 Although never specifically stated,
the Fifth Circuit's rationale appears to be that it could not find a case in
which the government had authorized such a right on behalf of the
public. This failure to unearth a public right was determinative of the
287. See BeVier, supra note 43, at 516 & n.126.
The media have no specific legal obligation to inform. ... Indeed, a strict liber-
tarian philosophy would claim that the press has no obligation nor responsibility to any-
one except itself. But the social responsibility concept decrees otherwise. If the media
are to function freely and be protected by the First Amendment, they must assume full
responsibility for what they print and air. And they must be responsible surrogates of
the people, purveying information to meet the people's "right to know."
C. STxrnnBEG, upra note 275, at 217.
288. See notes 137-62 supra and accompanying text. Reliance on the largely undefined con-
tours of the public's right to know is an outright invitation for governmental intervention prior to
publication to determine what the public is entitled to know. See Goodale, supra note 160, at 32-
34.
289. Among journalists' multitudinous inconsistencies, Professor John Merrill noted their pro-
pensity to "speak of the people's right to know as they routinely keep the people from knowing
certain things.' J. Mnmi uu, supra note 56, at 17.
290. 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 914 (1978).
291. 556 F.2d at 1278-79.
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cameraman's asserted right.292 The court noted that the cameraman
was not being prohibited from simulating or relating the incident.293
He thus could convey the same content as the two print reporters294
admitted to witness the execution.295 In suggesting alternatives to
broadcasting the actual execution, however, the court demonstrated the
power of the state to control the content of the broadcast by controlling
the information gathering. Because a simulation or a narrative was ac-
ceptable but a broadcast was not, the content of the latter must vary in
a substantive, qualitative way from the content of the former.296 As the
district court had observed, the Texas prison officials did not object to
giving the cameraman physical access to the execution chamber but to
the possible public reaction when the dramatic event was broadcast
into living rooms across the country.297 The state successfully substi-
292. The court did not find it significant that the prison authorities had already planned to
broadcast the event via closed circuit television to a select audience. See Id at 1279. The court
sidestepped the ingenious argument of amicus curiae that the closed circuit broadcast constituted
a publication. See Amicus Brief for Appellee, Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, The
Newspaper Guild, AFL-CIO, and Radio Television News Directors Ass'n at 14, Garrett v. Estelle,
556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977). Once broadcast, the state could not restrict further dissemination
without overcoming the heavy presumption of unconstitutionality imposed on prior restraints.
See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557-58 (1975); Litwack, The Doctrine
of Prior Restraint, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 519, 533-34 (1977). But, as is always the case, the
court had the last word in this exercise in semantics, declaring that prior restraint was not at issue
because the state was affording only access to the broadcast. See 556 F.2d at 1279-80.
293. 556 F.2d at 1279.
294. See id at 1276-77.
295. The appeals court asserted that alternate means of reporting the event would not inhibit
the free flow of ideas and information and that no differences existed in the quality of the various
methods of reporting. Id at 1278. But see Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433
U.S. 562, 581 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting).
296. Although the content of a newspaper is primarily verbal, the essence of the content of the
television medium is pictorial. See Frank, The 'Grammar of Film' in Television News, 51 JOUR-
NALISM Q. 245, 245 (1974); Schuneman, Visual Aspects of Television News: Communicator,
Message, Equioment, 43 JOURNALISM Q. 281, 282-83 (1966); Zimmerman, supra note 89, at 660-
65, 668 ("The various communications media. . . do not produce speech that is interchangea-
ble."); Media and the First Amendment in a Free Society, 60 GEO. L.J. 867, 937 (1972).
[I]t is the camerawork, motion picture film, and edited newsfilm which give televi-
sion this characeristic of personalized mass communication. In the minds of many, the
sinew and strength of electronic reporting is newsfilm.
A story is a story. But with newsfilm, the same story is an experience; a living
animated event the viewer shares with the newsfilm reporter. Newsfilm makes your
viewer an eyewitness to the news. It is a fresh, provocative, challenging approach to
journalism, bursting with impact and realism.
J. ATKINS & L. WILLETTE, FILMING TV NEWS AND DOCUMENTARIES 10 (1965).
Control of the technological aspects of news gathering is the most effective means of control-
ling broadcasting. See Allen v. Combined Communications Corp., 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2417,
2419 (D. Colo. July 22, 1981).
297. See Garrett v. Estelle, 424 F. Supp. 468, 472-73 & n.2 (N.D. Tex.), rev'd, 556 F.2d 1274
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 914 (1978). See generally 424 F. Supp. at 469-70 (media
policy regarding executions promulgated by Texas Department of Corrections).
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tuted its judgment concerning the legitimate public interest in the
broadcast for that of the broadcaster. The scope of the broadcasting
right was necessarily delimited by the scope of the gathering right.
Even if the cameraman had chosen to combine the gathering and
broadcasting into a single act by broadcasting the event live, the state's
ability to control the gathering component most likely would have
taken precedence over the cameraman's supposed ability to control the
broadcast.
Even if the broadcast of an actual execution comprises primarily
emotive rather than informational content, restriction of such expres-
sion creates serious constitutional questions;298 the "emotive function
. ..may often be the more important element of the overall message
sought to be communicated. ' 299 The state clearly departs from a liber-
tarian scheme when it imposes conditions on gathering for no other
reason than to suppress some expression while allowing dissemination
of other, related expression. Government breaches the rule of neutral-
ity,300 a rule that social-responsibility theory does not require.
C. A News-Gathering Right Reconsidered.
The application of social-responsibility principles to press rights of
gathering/publication stems from a fundamental analytical error made
in the first prison-access cases. When the maxim that the press is due
rights no greater than those of the public was borrowed from
Branzburg to justify the results of Saxbe and Pell,30 1 the analysis was
restricted to the narrow question of whether the press merited a privi-
lege not enjoyed by the public.30 2 The Court may be understood as
being guided by the libertarian doctrine that governmental conferral of
access privileges may compromise the independence of those privi-
298. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1200-02
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party, 69 M11 2d
605, 611-12, 373 N.E.2d 21, 22-23 (1978) (per curiam); Rockwell v. Morris, 12 App. Div. 2d 272,
282, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 35, aft'dmenL, 10 N.Y.2d 721, 722, 219 N.Y.S.2d 268, 269, cert. denied, 368
U.S. 913 (1961) ("shocking quality" and "alarming impact"). Professor Daniel Farber, in an
engaging and insightful analysis of Justice Harlan's first amendment philosophy, concluded that
offensive expression has merit if for no other reason than because it reinforces people's under-
standing of the reason for its offensiveness. See Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse: An Essay on
Professor Bickel, Justice Harlan, and the Enduring Sign'ficance of Cohen v. California, 1980 DuKE
LJ. 283, 301-03. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
299. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
300. See Bezanson, supra note 1, at 763-65. See notes 21-32 supra and accompanying text.
301. See Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 834-35 (1974).
302. See Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 849-50 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817, 833-34 (1974).
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leged.303 The press in Saxbe and Pell argued, however, that a substan-
tial number of persons already enjoyed access to interview specific
inmates.3 4 Therefore, the issue was not one of special access, but of
equal access. More significantly, the Court's analysis obscured basic
issues of the government's authority to prohibit access altogether or to
provide access at its discretion, as well as the issue of the interrelation-
ship between gathering and publication .or broadcasting. By not ad-
dressing these issues, the Court resolved them in the government's
favor.
A straightforward libertarian analysis may dictate that anything
that can be published can be gathered. The private interest in dissemi-
nating particular content seems no different at the gathering than at the
publication stage, and governmental interference at any stage seems to
contravene the libertarian principle of independence from government.
If anything could be gathered absent a clear and present danger, how-
ever, the likelihood is that the clear and present danger test would be
diluted rather than the gathering right expanded.30 5 Thus, constructing
a gathering right defined in terms of the publication right may create
irresistible pressures to narrow the publication right. The extent of pro-
tection may be inversely proportional to the generosity with which a
prior restraint is defined.3t° An alternative to conjuring up a gathering
right of dimensions lesser than or equivalent to those of the publication
right is to assess forthrightly the scope of government authority to con-
ceal its processes from scrutiny. This analysis can be facilitated by
maintaining the first amendment focus solely on the publication or
speech component of the dissemination process, and by examining in
303. See Bezanson, supra note 1, at 734.
304. Relatives, friends, lawyers, clergymen, and public officials could visit with prisoners at
length. See Comment, The Might of the Press to Gather Information After Branzburg and Pell, 124
U. PA. L. REv. 166, 188 n.124 (1975) (quoting Brief for Appellant at 6, Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817 (1974); Brief for Respondents at 43-44, Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974)).
305. See D. GILLMOR & J. BARRON, MASS COMMUNICATION LAW 440 (3d ed. 1979); Sanford,
Richmond Newspapers: End of a Zigzag Trail?, COLuM. JOURNAiSM REV., Sept.-Oct. 1980, at
47. Access to grand jury proceedings, tax records, and discussions of prison security are just a few
examples of the many hard questions that might arise. See also Statler, Let the Sunshine In?, 67
A.B.A.J. 573, 574-75 (1981) (commitment to openness adversely affected effectiveness of Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission).
306. See D. GiLLMOR & J. BARRON, MASS COMMUNICATION LAW 17 (3d ed. 1979); Dworlin,
supra note 43, at 50 (if the first amendment becomes an "all-purpose shield," then it will ulti-
mately be weakened). James Madison, who presented the first draft of the first amendment, cau-
tioned against absolute provisions in the Bill of Rights because the provisions "however strongly
marked on paper will never be regarded when opposed to the decided sense of the public, and
after repeated violations in extraordinary cases they will lose even their ordinary efficacy." Letter
to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), reprinted in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 274 (G.
Hunt ed. 1904).
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detail an aspect of that process that has been largely ignored--govern-
ment speech.
Government, too, has a right of speech.307 The speech-and-debate
clause308 of the United States Constitution is one source of govern-
ment's speech right. Alexander Meiklejohn contends that the speech-
and-debate clause was intended to protect absolute freedom of discus-
sion of public affairs.3 9 But because Meiklejohn saw no distinction
between the governors and the governed,310 the protection of the clause
was merely derivative of the first amendment freedom enjoyed by
all.3 11 Meiklejoin's interpretation of that freedom is consistent with
social-responsibility principles in ensuring the right, not of the speaker,
but of the audience.312 Thus, speech by governors is not "protected"
for the benefit of government, but for the benefit of the general welfare.
Meiklejohn posited that the protection of expression is premised on its
value of promoting self-government.31 3 It seems that anything govern-
ment says is by its nature related to self-government. 314 But it is that
which government prefers not to say that is of greatest relevance:
Just so far as, at any point, the citizens who are to decide an issue are
denied acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or disbe-
lief or criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result
must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good. It
is that mutilation of the thinking process of the community against
which the First Amendment to the Constitution is directed. The
principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the
program of self-government.315
307. See Methodist Fed'n for Social Action v. Eastland, 141 F. Supp. 729, 731 (D.D.C. 1956)
(court cannot order Congress not to publish a potentially defamatory telegram); People ex rel
Difabis v. Barr, 83 I. 2d 191, 209, 414 N.E.2d 731, 738-39 (1980) (federal and state rights of
government expression may be limited by Open Meeting Act); Z. CHAFEE, JR., supra note 90, at723-82; CommissIoN, supra note 109, at 81; T. EM SON, supra note 19, at 697-716; L. TRNs,
AMEaicAN CONsTrrtuioNAL LAW 590-91 (1978); Yudof, When Governments Speak Toward a
Theory of Government Expression and the First Amendment, 57 Tx. L. REv. 863, 865 (1979);
Ziegler, supra note 275, at 580-81; ef. Barnstone v. University of Houston, 514 F. Supp. 670, 683
(S.D. Tex. 1980) (public television station a governmental entity for purposes of first amendment
analysis), rev'd on other grounds, 660 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 662 F.2d 1110
(1981).
308. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
309. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 144, at 35-37; see Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 569 (1959)
(Harlan, J.).
310. A. ManEamoHN, supra note 144, at 6.
311. Id 37.
312. See notes 168-69 supra and accompanying text.
313. See A. MmELOHN, supra note 144, at 24-27. Compare id at 35-37 with id at 37-39.
314. One may note, by analogy, the broad scope of "legislative acts" protected by the speech-
and-debate clause. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616-18, 624 (1972). But see Hutch-
inson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 127-33 (1979).
315. A. MEImLEsOm, supra note 144, at 26 (emphasis deleted).
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Application of social-responsibility principles to government ex-
pression imposes affirmative obligations on government to provide the
public with information. 316 The ramifications of this statement become
more apparent when it is recognized that it is governmental31 7 expres-
sion that proponents of a news-gathering right most often seek to
gather.318 Because the facts that the public is entitled to know are in
316. See Emerson, supra note 160, at 14. Professor Yudof notes that although the right to
know may be a sound basis for compelling disclosure of information that government prefers not
to reveal, it does not support an independent right of government expression. "The right to know
formulation simply obfuscates the analysis of how and why governments should have rights
against the community under a first amendment adopted to limit government power." Yudof,
supra note 307, at 869. A social-responsibility proponent may respond that no "rights against the
community" are contemplated when it is the right of the community that serves as the touchstone.
Yudofis concerned, however, with the excesses of government speech; the present analysis focuses
more on the deficiencies in government speech and press. Yudof's articulation of an ultra vires
standard to govern government participation in communications networks, see Id 912-17, demon-
strates his concern with "ways to limit government speech." Id 918. The present analysis is
concerned with encouraging government speech, especially in those cases in which government
would rather withhold in whole or in part information relevant to self-governance. The two anal-
yses can be considered harmonious if one views the present analysis as concentrating on the first
half of the following sentence, and Yudofs on the second half: "Government expression is critical
to the operation of a democratic polity, but the power of governments to communicate is also the
power to destroy the underpinnings of government by consent." Id 865. Yudofs orientation is
analogous to the proposition advanced by Professor Van Alstyne that the first amendment "im-
plicitly requires some silencing of the government itself." Van Alstyne, supra note 271, at 532.
See generally Ziegler, supra note 275.
317. Because application of social-responsibility theory hinges under the proposed analysis on
a determination that the source of speech is government, government speech must be clearly dis-
tinguished from nongovernment speech. Government is not, of course, a monolith; its voices ema-
nate from numerous individuals. One method of determining whether those individuals are
engaged in expression is to resort to "state action" analysis. See, e.g., CBS v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 114-21 (1973) (Burger, C.J.). But the ambiguities in such analysis, compare
id with id at 174-81 (Brennan, J., dissenting), do not lend themselves to the clarity with which the
private and public spheres should be distinguished. See Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibllty of the
Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness and Access, 85 HARv. L. REV. 768, 783 (1972). A more
definitive basis is therefore desirable. Because it may be prudent to err in favor of private inter-
ests, the duties associated with government speech may be limited to those in government's em-
ploy. The speech of government employees could then be broken down further into speech
related to government and speech not related to government. See T. EMERSON, supra note 19, at
563-92. The possibility that this categorization may still prove overinclusive should be considered
in light of the possible underinclusiveness of an even narrower categorization, such as speech by
public officials. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 119 n.8 (1979) (the category of "public
official" does not include all public employees, although its contours are not yet precisely drawn).
318. See Yudof, supra note 307 at 872-74. "Concerns about goveVnment expression crucially
Influence first amendment cases concerning... the right of the press to gather information for
publication, and the rights of individuals and organizations to compel government disclosure of
information." Id 873.
Just as the speech-and-debate clause protects both vritten and oral communications, see Doe
v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 617 (1972), the
first amendment as applied to government speech or expression as the terms are used here encom-
passes all forms of verbal communication. Thus, the information most commonly sought by the
press clearly involves government expression, whether it involves government documents or the
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the government's possession, the government appears to be the appro-
priate party to assume the obligations incumbent on the speaker in a
social-responsibility scheme. It seems paradoxical that under the cur-
rent approach the press must assert the public's right to know to exer-
cise its right of expression, but the government need cite only its own
interests as justification for speaking or not speaking.
Unlike Meiklejobn's analysis, however, the present analysis con-
templates application of libertarian, not social-responsibility, principles
to the speech rights of the governed. If government abides by its obli-
gation under social-responsibility theory to inform the public then it in
large part compensates for any possible shortcomings of libertarian ide-
als, 319 though leaving individuals and the press free to pursue their re-
content of government proceedings such as meetings, trials, and hearings. The prison-access cases
are somewhat of an anomaly because the expression element is not as clearly identifiable. Access
to a certain area of a jail or prison seems to involve information in a visual form, rather than in an
oral or textual form. Government conduct in managing a prison constitutes government speech
only if one resorts to a conduct-as-speech analysis. If this proposition is accepted, then regulation
of the expressive element of reception by an audience, see note 156 supra and accompanying text,
has to further an important or substantial governmental interest, be unrelated to the suppression
of expression, and be no greater than is essential to the furtherance of the governmental interest.
See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
The second requirement has been characterized as the Court's "definitive statement" of its
test. Ely, Flag Desecration: 4 Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
AmendmentAnalysis, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1482, 1496 (1975). But see Farber, supra note 298, at 743-
47 & nn.90, 93-94 & 96. This requirement perhaps would be the element most easily satisfied
because regulation of the conduct would be intended to restrict the expression of the media, see
notes 265-70 supra and accompanying text. Of course, as ordinarily interpreted, the regulation
must be directed at the conduct of the party whose expression is sought to be suppressed, see
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (regulation of draft card burning constitutional
infringement of burner's expression), rather than at the expression of third parties such as the
press in the prison-access cases. To contend that the government regulates its own conduct to
suppress its own expression is result-oriented, however, because the conduct was construed as
expression initially.
Another possibility is to leave the conduct-expression debate to others, compare Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (Black, ., dissenting) and T.
EMERSON, supra note 19, at 8-9, 19, 328-44 with L. TamE, AMERICAN CONSTrrmoNAL LAW 598-
601 (1978) and Baker, Scope of the FirstAmendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 964,
1009-12 (1978), and explore the potential of the social-responsibility theory. Because the public
should know more about prisons, see Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 36-38 (1978) (Stevens,
J., dissenting); Burger, Our OptionsAre Limited, 18 VILL. L. REV. 165, 167 (1972), it seems incum-
bent on the government to provide this information, at least in part, by disseminating the informa-
tion and ensuring that both the media and the general public have access to it. Furthermore,
social-responsibility principles have been invoked to require that information be substantiated.
See note 198 supra and accompanying text. Government pronouncements on prison conditions
and occurrences, which the government would be obligated to provide, can best be substantiated
by giving access to press and public alike and by allowing the media to employ the tools peculiar
to their medium to fulfill their constitutionally protected function. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,
438 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring).
319. See notes 116-20, 124-26 supra and accompanying text.
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spective private interests.3 20 If government cannot make itself
responsible to the public, there exists no basis for believing that it can
make the press or any other institution responsible.
Under this interpretation of the Constitution, all branches of gov-
ernment at all levels assume the social responsibilities of government.
Each government entity has an obligation to further the right of the
public to be informed of the functioning of that entity. Ideally, every
discrete government entity would establish policies or enact laws pro-
viding for maximum access to records and proceedings. State legisla-
tures, 321 as well as Congress, 32 2 have already assumed, this
responsibility to varying degrees. Ironically, on occasion courts have
read negative inferences into disclosure provisions,323 thereby whittling
away the provisions' scope and freeing government from its responsi-
bilities. The public information provision of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, for example, has come to be considered "more as a
withholding statute than a disclosure statute. ' 324
Public officials, at times, have deliberately attempted to shirk their
responsibilities by circumventing application of open-meetings or
open-records statutes;325 and good-faith disputes inevitably will arise
320. See Yudof, supra note 307, at 863. "[Clourts could consider the need to strengthen cen-
ters of communication that will counter or check the persuasive powers of governments." Id 872.
"The greatest threat to the system of freedom of expression emanates from the welfare state, not
from a multitude of corporate, mass media, union, and other voices. . . . mhe potential for
pluralism lies in strengthening all elements of private sector communication." Id 873 (emphasis
in original); see T. EMERSON, supra note 19, at 671 (approves government action to extent that it
encourages multiplicity of private outlets).
321. Alabama enacted the first open-meetings statute in 1915. See Comment, R*here's the
Sunshine? Inadequacy ofennsylvania's Open Meeting Law, 82 DicK. L. REv. 719, 720 n.4 (1978).
For a complete listing of the laws effective in each of the other 49 states and the District of Colum-
bia, see id 719 n.4. For a compilation of the public-records laws effective in 47 states, see Com-
ment, The Pennsyltania Rf'ght to Know Statute" A Creature of the Legislature Shaped by the
Judiciary, 82 DicK. L. REv. 749, 749 n.4 (1978).
322. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 552(b) (1976).
323. See Cox v. Department of Justice, 576 F.2d 1302, 1307-08 (8th Cir. 1978); Hawkes v. IRS,
467 F.2d 787, 795 (6th Cir. 1972), on remnand, No. C-70-409 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 5, 1973), a 'd, 507
F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Imbrunone, 379 F. Supp. 256,260-61 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
But see Jordan v. Department of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc); Caplan v.
Bureau of AlcohoL'Tobacco & Firearms, 445 F. Supp. 699, 705 (S.D.N.Y.), af'don other grounds,
587 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1978). See also Pember, supra note 9, at 1190, 1198 (in enactment ofpublic-
records laws,, right of privacy created where none had been before).
324. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973) (construing Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324,
§ 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976)). See also Note, supra note 270, at 223-
25.
325. See, eg., Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 154-55
(1980) (documents deeded to Library of Congress); Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento
County Bd., 263 Cal. App. 2d 41, 49-50, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480,486-87 (1968) (citing report denouncing
widespread evasion of open-meeting obligations through "sneak" meetings and by means of eu-
phemisms such as executive session, conference, caucus, study or work session, and meeting of the
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over the scope and practical implementation of the public's right to
know. 326 Although the constitutional mandate to forward the public
interest in possessing information encompasses all branches, the judici-
ary, in addition to revealing its own processes, is required to resolve
disputes concerning other branches.327
Whether courts consider the obligations of government to inform
the public or the scope of a news-gathering right, the "public's right to
know" yields no definitive standards to guide decisionmaking. Posing
the question in terms of government expression more clearly focuses
the analysis in two respects. First, no longer must the courts engage in
futile attempts to segregate the gathering component of the communi-
cation process. The issue is starkly presented as the obligation of gov-
ernment to inform the public. Extraneous issues, such as the
institutional status328 of the press as an intermediary, no longer detract
from that central question. Second, when the question is posed in
terms of government expression it is clear that the courts are not substi-
tuting their judgment for that of the media, but for that of a coordinate
committee of the whole); People exrel. Difanis v. Barr, 83 M. 2d 191, 201, 414 N.E.2d 731, 735
(1980) (convening informal caucus to discuss public business constitutes illegal circumvention of
Open Meetings Act); D. GILLMOR & J. BARRON, MASS COMMUNICATION LAW 469 (3d ed. 1979)
("open" meeting held in neighboring state). Such instances indicate a tendency toward secrecy in
government. See Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (quoting Sen. Baker); J.
MERRILL, supra note 56, at 105; J. WIGGINS, FREEDOM OR SECRECY at x (rev. ed. 1964); Brant,
The Constitution andthe ight to Know, in MASS MEDIA AND THE LAW 73 (D. Clark & E. Hutchi-
son eds. 1970); Knoll, If. . ., THE QUILL, June 1979, at 31 (published news stories classified as
secret); Morland, The H-bomb Secret, THE PROGREssIvE, Nov. 1979, at 14, 15 (Senator's questions
regarding a plutonium shortage classified as secret); Pember, supra note 9, at 1189; Note, supra
note 270, at 210.
One author interpreted recent judicial and legislative developments concerning the federal
Freedom of Information Act to indicate "a clear trend toward restricting the availability of disclo-
sure." Comment, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1980, 1981 DUKE LJ.
338, 376.
326. See note 288 supra and accompanying text. Professor Be Vier, who finds no support in
the Constitution for a right to know, suggests that everything, or at least most things, that the
public needs to know are revealed in the give-and-take of the political process. Be Vier, supra
note 43, at 512-15. The question indeed may fairly be raised whether the public has a need or
even a desire to be fully informed. See Blasi, supra note 20, at 561-62.
In fact, some have posited a point at which there may be too much information. See
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882, 2916 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); W.
HOCKING, supra note 23, at 164 n.4.
In the interest of realism it is pertinent to remark at this point that there is such a thing as
a too expressive, too loquacious, too unreticent society, taking out in endless talk what a
soberer guard at the lips would reduce to relevant and sincere discourse. The liberal
tradition has taken a too quantitative view of the virtues of speech; and the time is not
far away when humanity will revolt against the flood of blab and print.
Id 89 n.3.
327. See D. GILLMOR & J. BARRON, MASS COMMUNICATION LAW 439, Comment 2 (3d ed.
1979).
328. See note 1 supra and notes 234-39 supra and accompanying text.
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branch of government. The Supreme Court has alluded to the delicate
separation-of-powers problems that such inquiry entails,329 but it has
avoided them by framing the issue as one of news gathering and by
resorting to the "no greater than" formula, thereby implicitly deferring
to the other branches.330
Because the basis for judicial review rests on the twin postulates
that the Constitution is not only law, but law that the courts can "ex-
pound and interpret, '331 it is imperative that the courts have a defini-
tive constitutional criterion to determine the obligations of other
branches.3 32 The criterion on which the courts must expound is the
value of self-government inherent in the first amendment, and indeed
throughout the Constitution.3 33 Indisputably aware of government's
obligation to account to the public, the framers enumerated various
specific affirmative duties to communicate. 334 But the affirmative duty
of the greatest scope is necessarily the least specific. The free flow of
information among citizens and between citizens and their government
is all that keeps the government "in due subjection" 335 to its citizens
rather than vice versa.3 36 The power of information is the power by
which the public controls government. 3 7 But the power of information
is a two-edged sword, and government can use it to its own advan-
329. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 12 (1978) (Burger, CJ.). See notes 240-43 supra
and accompanying text.
330. See notes 236-37, 282-83, 292 supra and accompanying text.
331. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803); see L. TRiN, AMERicAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 24 (1978).
332. Judges should have a more specific justification for their decision than the palatability of
the result, see Cass, supra note 20, at 1309, particularly when substituting their judgment for that
of another branch of government.
Professor Alexander Bickel noted that the judiciary is particularly well-suited to the contem-
plation and pursuit of principles. See A. BxcEL., TAE LEAST DANon ous BRANcH 25-28 (1962).
See generaly Freund, 2he Judicial Process in CivilLibertie Cases, in CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL
RIoHTS 3, 4 (V. Stone ed. 1977) (courts set a tone by articulating philosophical and legal bases for
our community). If the principle of accountability to the public is indeed a cornerstone of a
democracy, then its desuetude would most properly and effectively be exposed in a Supreme
Court opinion. The Court itself provides a salutary example of accountability by revealing in
detail, at least ostensibly, the rationales for its decisions, thus subjecting its opinions to scrutiny
and criticism. See Lewis, supra note 29, at 803. No less should be expected from it, however. See
C. STEI ERO, supra note 275, at 126-29, 131-32.
333. A. MEnu.EjOHN, supra note 144, at 14-15.
334. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5, cL 3; id art. I, § 9; id art. H, § 3.
335. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 247 (1936).
336. "The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative func-
tion.... mhe only really self-governing people is that people which discusses and interrogates
its administration." W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GbvmMmT-A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLI-
TICS 198 (Meridian ed. 1960).
337. Lewis, supra note 29, at 805-06.
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tage.338 The first amendment stands, however, for a very simple propo-
sition: freedom of speech and press. Once it is realized that that
freedom accrues to the public and not to the government, it is evident
that the first amendment prohibits government from using the informa-
tion in its possession in any manner that infringes the preeminent free-
dom of the public. The failure to release, in whole or in part,
information that furthers self-government is therefore contrary to the
broad command of the first amendment.
Because one cannot assert effectively a right to know something
until he knows what he seeks,339 a presumption of openness is neces-
sary340 to facilitate implementation of the first amendment's mandate.
In addition, the ad hoc nature of judicial review341 in a social-responsi-
bility scheme342 means that the value of self-goverment provides only a
starting point. The presumption in favor of disclosure is necessary to
prescribe the initial structuring of the analysis. The presumption may
be dispositive if the need for secrecy cannot survive close scrutiny at the
outset.343 But the government may present compelling reasons for se-
338. See notes 270-77 supra and accompanying text. See W. HOCKING, supra note 23, at 104;
Yudof, supra note 307, at 865.
339. See Note, supra note 270, at 215-16. Hocking made this point in the context of the
reader's relationship to the press; "He can hardly know, without seeing it, what it is that he
misses." W. HoCKING, supra note 23, at 198.
340. See Yudof, supra note 307, at 873. A presumption of openness replaces any contrary
presumption that government agents acted properly in restricting access. See Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1368 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
341. Commentary on the merits of ad hoc balancing differs. Compare Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109, 138, 141-45 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); Emerson, supra note 67, at 912-14,
and Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962) with Konigsberg v.
State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 520-25, 542-44 (1941)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Z. C-IAFEE, JR., supra note 28, at 31, and Mendelson, On the Mean-
ing of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 821, 825-26 (1962). See
generally Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion ofFreedom and Contraction of The-
ory, 29 STAN. L. REV. 431, 463-64 (1977). Chafee's misgivings about the balancing process are
related in Angell, Zechariah Chafee, r.-Individual Freedoms, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1341, 1343
(1957), noted in Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 253
n.26.
342. See text accompanying note 9 supra. It can be argued that judicial inquiry into the nature
and merit of private interests is discouraged in a libertarian scheme and that the individualistic
value of self-fulfillment is not subject to judicial assessment. Thus, libertarian interpretation may
lend itself to per se rules of general applicability. Inquiry into the public interest, on the other
hand, seems to require a case-by-case analysis to determine if a public interest indeed exists; such
an interest may even exist on both sides of the judicial scale, in which case judges have to assess on
which side the greater public interest rests.
343. "[W]hen government declines to reveal information vital to the formation of intelligent
political judgments by citizens, a constitutional or statutory right to know may be decisive in the
absence of compelling reasons to withhold the information." Yudof, supra note 307, at 869.
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crecy,344 in which case the court must assess the weight of the counter-
vailing right of the public to the information and attempt to balance the
opposing interests.3 45 Because the amorphous nature of the public's
right to know3 " subverts principled attempts at balancing, the analysis
must necessarily focus on the validity of the government's interests in
secrecy. The weight of the government's burden of overcoming the
presumption is, of course, crucial.
Foremost, the government's self-interest in nondisclosure must be
identified. Prevention of embarrassment, 347 unsubstantiated Issertions
of the need for national security,348 and other patently self-interested
motives are particularly suspect. Although government self-interest
and the public interest are not always mutually exclusive, care must be
taken that the ineluctable pressures for secrecy do not transform the
presumption of openness into the exception. In those instances in
which access wholly frustrates the objectives of government,349 or im-
poses a truly onerous burden on government, or in situations in which
not all who seek access can be accommodated, the court should try to
compromise rather than merely defer to government's discretion.350
Because government is charged with the duty correlative to the public's
right to know, efforts to assert the public's right not to know merit par-
ticular scrutiny. Most often the public alone should decide what infor-
344. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974); Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1,
13 (1932); Lewis, supra note 29, at 803; Powell, What Really Goes on at the Supreme Court, 66
A.B.AJ. 721 (1980). Openness may pose obstacles to the accomplishment of an agency's function,
see Statler, supra note 305, at 574-75, but efficiency and the goals of self-government are not
necessarily harmonious, and the former often must give way to the latter. Although autocracy is
the most efficient form of government it may not be the best or most desirable form of
government.
345. See Long v. IRS, 349 F. Supp. 871, 875 (W.D. Wash. 1972).
346. See note 288 supra.
347. See note 83 supra.
348. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (Black, J., concur-
ring); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967); Note, supra note 270, at 229.
349. See note 344 supra.
350. See, eg., Rose v. Department of Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 269 (2d Cir. 1974), a/fd, 425
U.S. 352 (1976); Reston, How Powe.ul is the "Monster' Freedom of Informnation Act?, Des Moines
Register, April 29, 1981, at IlA, col. 2. But see Memorandum from Attorney General William
French Smith to Heads of all Federal Departments and Agencies on Freedom of Information Act
(May 4, 1981) and accompanying news release (rescission of policy requiring release of records
unless demonstrable harm shown). See generally "Washington Counsel," CASE & COMMENT,
July-Aug. 1981, at 16. Thus, the result in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (citizen
without standing to demand information about CIA budget despite constitutional provision re-
quiring "a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money"), is
flawed because some accounting should have been provided even if not a detailed line-by-line
statement. Moreover, the Court employed a procedural device to obstruct a citizen's attempts to
hold his government accountable when the Court should have been seeking means to accommo-
date the citizen.
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mation it should receive.35' Administrative convenience may be
considered, but the business of governing should make generous al-
lowances for fulfilling the needs of the governed. 35 2
If the government's interest in secrecy proves to be compelling,
and if no compromise can be struck to accommodate both interests,
then the presumption favoring disclosure must yield to what is neces-
sarily an ad hoc balancing of interests. Although careful adherence to
the presumption should make disclosure the norm and deviation the
exception,353 this presumption should not have the same force and ef-
fect as the "heavy presumption" against prior restraint354 of
nongovernment speech. This dichotomy in analysis of presumptions is
necessary because different theories govern expression depending on
the source of the expression. It is because analysis of government ex-
pression, which is subject to different limitations and obligations re-
garding its dissemination, is beginning to control analysis of
nongoverment expression through means of the news-gathering arti-
fice that the libertarian foundations of nongovernment speech are im-
periled. A clear distinction must be maintained, therefore, between
government and nongovernment speech355 and between the theories
relevant to each. But of the innumerable puzzling questions that have
yet to be answered in applying both theories, determining which theory
is apposite seems a minor one. As Professor Ronald Cass observed in
another context, "In sum, although the various free speech principles
provide neutral, general bases for judicial scrutiny of governmental
control . . ., they depend ultimately on reasonable judges acting
reasonably to resolve specific problems in this area. '3 56
351. See, ag., Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (post office detention of "com-
munist political propaganda" unconstitutional). See note 357 infra and accompanying text.
352. Access should not only be allowed but encouraged, for example, by keeping charges as
minimal as possible and even waiving them if possible to accommodate the public interest. See,
ag., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (1976); Bonine, Public-Interest Fee
Waivers Under the Freedom of Infornation Act, 1981 DuKE L.J. 213, 262.
353. Cf Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (construing federal Free-
dom of Information Act); Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (construing
federal Freedom of Information Act).
354. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558 (1976) (quoting Organization for a
Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420
U.S. 546,558 (1975); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam);
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
355. See note 317 supra.
356. Cass, supra note 20, at 1316. As Justice Frankfurter noted, "TIThe mere formulation of a
relevant constitutional principle is the beginning of the solution of a problem, not its answer."
Illinois ex reZ McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
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Il. CONCLUSION
An accessible and accountable government is vitally important to
a self-governed society, as is a free and unfettered press. The first
amendment ensures both, albeit in different fashions. The determina-
tive consideration in analyzing press attempts to hold the government
accountable for its actions should not be whether the press seeks to
gather or to publish information. If it were necessary to memorialize
the affirmative duty of government to communicate to its citizens by
opening its doors and revealing its records, there is no better candidate
than these sage sentiments of Justice Blackmun:
[O]n close inspection it is seen that the State's protectiveness of its
citizens rests in large measure on the advantages of their being kept
m ignorance ....
There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic ap-
proach. That alternative is to assume that this information is not in
itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if
only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that
end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close
them.... It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of
suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely
available, that the First Amendment makes for us.3 57
If, on the other hand, government continues to exercise unbridled dis-
cretion in controlling information, then it will gain the definitive ad-
vantage in its adversarial contest with the press.
357. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 769-70 (1976).
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